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THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PREACHER

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THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE TEACHER

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE PARENT

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PREACHER

By

H. CRICHTON MILLER, M.A., M.D.,
Hon. Director, Tavistock Clinic for Functional Nerve Cases



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To

W.R.I.

L.P.J.

J.A.T.

Three prophets who have honoured the past and whom the future will delight the honour.

3929

PREFACE

A WORD of self-justification is called for on the part of an author who writes a book on this subject despite the fact that he has little philosophical and no theological training.

Among the considerations which have seemed to me to constitute an adequate justification for the appearance of this book are the following :—

1. In the work of mental analysis a great deal of material relating to religion presents itself for consideration. This material, with all its repressed elements, is not otherwise available.

2. As far as can be judged from their writings, few analysts seem to have used their religious experience to counteract a materialistic bias.

3. The therapeutic use of hypnotism and suggestion during a number of years before analytical methods were available, has given me an opportunity of appraising the value and limitations of suggestive mechanisms, not merely in connection with disease, but also in a wider sphere.

4. Parenthood may constitute no ground for self-praise, but it appears to offer an element of normality in experience which is not without value. This element is absent in the case of many clerical authors, and also in that of some well-known psycho-analysts.

The defects which the reader may note in this book are to be attributed not only to the limitations of the author's equipment already referred to, but also to the fact that it has been written in the somewhat scanty leisure of an absorbing professional life.

My sincere thanks are due to my friends, clerical and otherwise, who have encouraged me to attempt my task; to my wife for help both critical and constructive; to my secretary, Miss L. V. Southwell, for preparing the manuscript for the publisher; to Miss E. M. Sellar, Miss K. Witz, Mr. Rowe-Thomas and Rev. E. C. Rich for assistance in proof correction, and finally to Dr. Inge, Dr. Jacks and Professor Arthur Thomson for permitting the dedication.

My hope is that in so far as the book is destructive it may dislodge no stone that has a justified place in the edifice of modern

religious thought; and that in so far as it attempts to be constructive, it may indicate some points in that edifice that can be profitably reinforced.

H.C.M.

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I say that man was made to grow, not stop ;
That help he needed once, and needs no more,
Having grown but an inch by, is withdrawn ;
For he hath new needs, and new helps to these.
This imports solely, man should mount on each
New height in view ; the help whereby he mounts,
The ladder-rung his foot has left, may fall,
Since all things suffer change save God the Truth.
Man apprehends Him newly at each stage
Whereat earth's ladder drops, its service done ;
And nothing shall prove twice what once was proved.

R. Browning—("A Death in the Desert.")

CHAPTER I

THE UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVE AND ITS PLACE IN LIFE

Synopsis

Difference between the old and the new Psychology.
The IDEAL and the REAL EGO: the significance of the unconscious motive.
Object of this book.
True religion welcomes fair-minded criticism and accepts new methods of scientific investigation.
Resentment of some religious bodies to psychological exploration.
Christianity to-day in a similar position to that which has arisen at many points in the history of religion.
Process of rationalising.
Ethical sincerity. Psychological repression.
Forgetting as a defence mechanism.
Factors which influence daily life should be taken cognisance of in religious life.

THE UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVE AND ITS PLACE IN LIFE

THE new psychology differs from the old academic psychology in one fundamental point. It takes into consideration the unconscious motive as a dynamic factor. The old psychology failed to recognise, or, at best, attributed but trifling value to any mental factor which happened to be outside the field of consciousness. Thus, when a man proclaimed himself a convinced believer in—let us say—the divine right of kings, it limited its investigations to the grounds upon which he based his conviction. The new psychology, on the other hand, seeks out reasons for such a belief which are not present in the believer's consciousness, some of which reasons he may even repudiate energetically. It asks, for instance, what the believer has to gain or lose by the general rejection of

such a view. It asks how far the belief was held by his parents or by others with whom he tends to identify himself. It seeks to trace the source of the belief and investigates the circumstances under which it first took form. It may even study the individual's dream-life to ascertain what light, if any, can be derived from this source. In short, the new psychology refuses to accept *prima facie* evidence as adequate in the study of the human mind.

As a consequence, it follows that much of what we attribute to worthy motives has to be put down to unworthy, or, at least, less worthy, motives. In the light of analytical psychology we find ourselves much less respectable than we previously imagined ourselves to be: therefore mankind does not take kindly to this more searching form of psychology. It follows also that in every one of us there are two distinct egos: the first is the ego we wish to believe we are. It is called the Ideal Ego. The second is the ego we really are. It is called the Real Ego. The difference between the two is constituted by those motives which we fail to discern in ourselves—generally because we consider them

less reputable than the motives which we admit. Two energetic Labour leaders are known to the writer. They are both perfectly sincere and they preach the same gospel. The first is a born rebel, who by reason of his early development and temperamental endowment is, always has been, and ever will be, on the side of the minority. The other is a Narcissan, an undeveloped type who has never got beyond the adolescent phase of admiring his own image. He loves to hear the sound of his own voice. He enjoys being the centre of attention. He becomes infatuated by applause, and popularity is the breath of life to him. Neither of these men is in the least aware of the true dynamic of his life. Were either of them thus conscious of his motive, he would be a hypocrite, and the hypocrite, being consciously insincere, is adequately dealt with by the old psychology. Neither of them is a hypocrite, and therefore their failure cannot be regarded as an ethical failure. It is a psychological failure: the failure of self-knowledge.

In every walk of life examples may be found. The Narcissan is at least as common in the ranks of the Primrose League. The rebel is

fighting for every losing cause. The propagandist is met with wherever there is scope for propaganda. His determination to bring other men to share his point of view will drive him to believe passionately in any cause that will serve his purpose. To him it matters not whether it be vegetarianism or anti-vaccination, provided there be room for expressing his power urge in the wide field of human opinion. But this true motive is hidden from him. His ideal ego is the disinterested champion of a progressive movement, while his real ego is inspired by an insatiable lust for dominating men's minds.

If, therefore, the new psychology introduces fresh criteria both of thought and behaviour, it manifestly presents a new challenge to religion. As long as psychology remained on the conscious plane, those who were concerned with religion were to be excused for accepting conscious motives and conscious processes as final in their investigations. But they can no longer do this. They must accept the challenge of the new psychology, and subject their material to the far more searching scrutiny of analysis. The present volume is written with the object of stimulating them

to face unconscious factors and to reject unsparingly all that is found to be less reputable than it has hitherto appeared to be. This challenge is one which religious partisans of every creed and denomination must face fearlessly, or accept the alternative of proclaiming themselves obscurantists. There is an Eastern saying: "No wind killeth the tree that Allah hath planted." Those who feel that their religion has this charter of indestructibility will welcome all fair-minded criticism, and will hasten to accept new scientific methods of investigation. But in all lands there are churches which, to use Lecky's description, "have gone dumb with old age, and only mumble delirium prior to dissolution." The representatives of these churches have the best of reasons for resenting psychological exploration. They will claim, as their predecessors always have claimed, that what is thought, said, and done in the name of religion is too sacred for the hand of the profane psychologist. They will demand that criticism should be favourable, before they concede that it is fair-minded. They will insist that the body of the church—*i.e.*, of their church—is too healthy to require any

exploratory operation, rather than admit that it is too sickly to survive such a proceeding. At many points in history, religion has been faced with somewhat similar situations. Copernicus and Galileo, Darwin and Huxley, represent two great scientific issues. In both of these the forces of organised Christianity were brought into the field to fight against truth, and to suffer the fate of those who do so. A similar situation exists to-day. The challenge of the new psychology cannot be ignored. Those who accept it will come through the encounter, some much changed, some little changed, none, however, unchanged. Those who refuse to meet the challenge will remain unchanged, and posterity will read their vehement protestations and repudiations with the same amazement which we experience to-day when we read certain well-known polemics of the mid-Victorian period on the subject of science and religion.

Psychologists use the term "rationalising" to describe the manipulation of logical processes in the interest of an unconscious or repressed motive. Man is an incurable rationaliser. Bacon says that "man makes a

science to his liking." He sets up a religion to his liking, a political system to his liking, an economic theory to his liking. And what is of vital importance for us to realise is that in so doing he succeeds more or less in convincing himself that his reasoned belief is completely independent of emotional bias. Now to rationalise successfully we must repress. In other words we have to thrust out of consciousness ideas that are antagonistic to the desired conclusion. Some people repress with alarming ease ; we say of them that they are constantly deceiving themselves, and it matters little whether they are sincere or insincere—the result is outwardly the same : that black is always white when they want it to be so. But with those who have less facility in repression, it is otherwise. If they are sincere they will be fair-minded and judicial in their conclusions ; black will be black to them whether they wish it to be so or not. If they are insincere they will know that black is black, and say it is white when it suits them.

In all human affairs we have to consider these two contributing factors—the ethical one of sincerity, and the psychological one of

repression. Much confusion and injustice are born of the failure to differentiate between the two. Sometimes we think a man is fair-minded because he is obviously sincere. At other times we condemn a man as insincere because he propounds a view which is illogical, but favourable to his own interests. In politics we see this constantly. The narrow-minded representative of a certain section of the community holds a political creed which involves palpable injustice to another section. If he be sincere, as is usually the case, he has reached his conclusions by a process of repressing the claims of the other side. If he be insincere, he sees the claims of the other side, but refuses to admit them.

It is probable that in every case of repression there is a theoretical factor of insincerity —that is to say, that for an instant of time the individual sees that a certain idea is incompatible with the desired conclusion, and says to himself: "I had better forget that," and forthwith does so. If I throw a stone into the air, there must be, theoretically, a moment when it is stationary, namely, between its ascent and descent. It is also obvious that between "pure" repression, which is psycho-

logical, and downright insincerity, which is ethical, there is a range of mixed processes in which the two are combined. But for practical purposes we may limit ourselves to the ideas of psychological repression and ethical insincerity.

The moralist of yesterday dealt with the ethical factor of insincerity: the analytical psychologist of to-day deals with the psychological factor of repression. These two points of view must be combined in the religious investigator of to-morrow.

Now this combination is, and necessarily must be, a difficult one. Let us take a simple example. A young man on leaving the university joins a philanthropic settlement in the East End of London. His father is a wealthy man, and he, as his father's heir, might be living a life of ease and affluence. His conscious motive is a desire to help the under dog, and he is applauded by the moralists. But in the course of analysis, it transpires that the father is a selfish and dominating man, that for years the son had been rebellious towards him, that his decision to work in the East End had incurred his father's annoyance, and that his unconscious

motive was, or might have been, that of asserting his independence, and revolting against his father, and satisfying himself that he was morally superior to his father. The analyst forthwith attributes the man's conduct to second-rate motives, devoid of any ethical value. But the father dies, the son inherits his wealth, and five years later is still working diligently and enthusiastically in his settlement. It is therefore plain that the unconscious motive is no longer attributable, and the conscious altruistic motive must now be accepted. But is it not possible that the altruistic motive was always operative? Or is it not conceivable that the unconscious motive of rebellion against the father was never more than a partial motive. Or it may be that at first the unconscious motive was the dynamic one, and that gradually the alleged altruistic motive replaced it. This evaluation of conscious and unconscious motives must be purely speculative so far as outside observers are concerned. The only real arbiter of his own motives is the individual himself, and he is entirely unreliable unless he can be trusted to assess the unconscious factors.

It has already been said that some people tend to repress much less than others. The small minority of mankind who repress little are, in general, trustworthy in the account they give of their motives. But the average person is open to continual deception despite his firm conviction that he knows his own motives. If he is to give a valid assessment of his own motives, he must be in touch with his unconscious. To many this can only be possible by the guidance of an analyst; with some auto-analysis is possible and effective. Returning then to our original example, we see that (1) the moralist's appreciation of his original decision is to be received with reserve; (2) the psychologist's attribution of his action to unconscious and unworthy motives cannot be final; (3) the man's own estimate of the dynamic motive or motives can only be accepted as final when he is in contact with his own unconscious.

Our reactions to environment and circumstance are constantly influenced by factors that ordinarily elude our notice. A young woman of twenty-five was troubled by a variety of neurotic symptoms. Her home environment was alleged to be favourable.

The outstanding feature of the case was an inordinate devotion to the mother and an apparent reluctance to be separated from her even for a short time. On analytical investigation, it was discovered that the patient had a deep-rooted resentment against the mother, based mainly on the fact that from her earliest years she had been allowed to understand that the mother was profoundly disappointed that she was a girl, as there were already three daughters and no sons. This resentment showed itself in open intractability and general resistance to the mother's influence. At the age of nineteen other emotional factors entered in, and the patient started on a course of "compensatory" devotion to her. This was calculated to keep up a feeling of noble restitution, and it came to be accepted by the patient as a perfectly genuine attachment, until she realised, through analysis, that it was spurious from beginning to end. After this revelation the symptoms ceased, and the patient has since led a very active and useful life.

A young naval officer suffered from a trying neurosis. He had had a successful career, and professed to be very enthusiastic about his profession. He applied for an arduous

and very unattractive appointment. His conscious reason for doing so was that he loved hard work, and there was some hazard in this appointment which appealed to him. On analysis, it became clear to him that he had applied for this appointment to satisfy himself that he was no coward, because once in the war he had developed an illness which interfered with his carrying out a very dangerous mission. He recognised that the illness had been defensive in character, and that fear, which he had refused to admit to himself, was the cause of it. Now he was arranging for an act of expiation, without being aware of this unconscious motive at all.

To these examples we may apply the familiar simile of the iceberg. A fraction of it is visible—like our conscious motive—above the surface : nine-tenths are invisible. The submerged portion is actuated by currents, while the rest is pressed upon by the wind. Where wind and current coincide there is rapid progress, but it is only when wind and current happen to be opposed that we can assess the force and direction of the latter. Ideally, the conscious and unconscious motives should be in harmony, but we all experience occasions

when conscious purpose is frustrated by some "accidental" error or failure of mental functioning. We are accustomed to attribute these errors to chance, inattention, absent-mindedness, habit—or to no reason at all—but all these negative explanations of why things happen imply some sort of positive. The attention is not complete inattention or lapse of consciousness, and, as such, demands some conditioning factor. Habit is one of the more satisfactory explanations when it can be adduced, but it is often inapplicable, and even when it is, it raises further questions —*e.g.*, why this failure of conscious control at this particular point? Bergson's treatment of the Idea of Disorder should be recalled. We never find absolute disorder—only a different sort of order—vital instead of mechanical: an order we fail to comprehend instead of one we understand. We cannot postulate chaos. So "the disordered mind," as Bernard Hart has shown, exhibits definite formations. The idea of disorder gets us nowhere; we must strive to formulate working hypotheses.

We must accept, then, that in the working of our minds, there are operative factors

totally or partially cut off from our conscious thought and purpose. Nothing illustrates this better than do the phenomena of forgetting. Without committing ourselves to the Freudian doctrine that all forgetting is due to affective causes, we recognise that repression often acts as a defence mechanism whereby the painful memory sinks below the surface of consciousness. Darwin [1] wrote: "I had, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely, that whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought came across me which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favourable ones."

The woman who reproaches her lover for forgetfulness intuitively assumes the affective factor in the act and consequently implies culpability where, *prima facie*, there can be none. The exaggerated penitence of the lover frequently shows that he accepts this implication. To forget to post letters may, if it be habitual, call for no specific explanation, but

1 *Life of Charles Darwin*, 1902, p. 42.

not infrequently it may signify resentment at having been bothered with the duty, uncertainty about whether the reply we propose to post is the wise one, resistance to sending a cheque which will assuredly overdraw our bank account, and so on. The house surgeon who goes out and leaves the light on in his room may possibly have an unconscious desire that his absence shall not become known.

A surgeon who had served in France during the war had occasion recently to furnish a statement of his service and experience in applying for a hospital post. Having sent his draft to be typewritten he cast his eye over the finished document. To his amazement he noticed that he had served at the 32nd General Hospital. This was a very careless slip on the part of the typist ; it had been the 34th. He took the matter up with the typist, who, in self-defence, referred to the original draft in the surgeon's own hand-writing, and there, to his bewilderment, he saw 32nd and not 34th. When he referred this incident to an analyst the following facts transpired :— When he was originally drafted to the 34th General Hospital he had some claim and hope to be consulting surgeon to the army area. A

junior of his in civil life had, however, been appointed, and our surgeon, therefore, had the galling experience of having to call in his own junior for certain final decisions, while he was obliged to recognise his superior military rank, to say nothing of the extra pay involved by a consulting appointment. In consequence, the slip whereby he wrote 32nd General Hospital for 34th represented the old feeling of resentment that he had not been in the superior position.

If, then, our daily life is so constantly influenced by factors which the old psychology ignored to a great extent, it is obvious that we should take cognisance of such factors in our religious life if we are to apply to it the fresh illumination which the new psychology makes possible.

CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO RELIGION: INSTINCTS AND THE IDEAL: DETERMINISM AND FREE-WILL

Synopsis

Definitions of Religion.
The function of the psychologist in relation to it.
Classification of the content of religion.
Phenomena of subjective religious experience, instincts and ideals.
What are the sources of the religious dynamic?
Views of representative modern thinkers.
Unconscious motives may bias the critic as well as the upholder of religion.
Futility of modern attempt to reduce idealism to instinctive activity.
Necessity for science and metaphysics to unite to answer the question.
Common attitudes to religion.
Tests which the psychologist feels justified in applying to any given manifestation of religion.

PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO RELIGION: INSTINCTS AND THE IDEAL: DETERMINISM AND FREE-WILL.

RELIGION has been defined as "man's recognition of a world order in which he himself is merged." Pratt offers the following definition :—" The serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceived as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies." [1] A simpler, and perhaps adequate, definition would be "man's recognition of conflict and his attempt to resolve it on a spiritual plane."

The function of the psychologist in relation to religion is described by Pratt as follows :— " He will proceed on the assumption that,

[1] J. B. Pratt. *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 2.

for the purposes of science, religious facts are not different in kind from other psychic facts. . . . Whenever possible he will 'explain' these facts by subsuming them under the laws of general psychology. . . . The reader may perhaps question whether such a procedure is justifiable. He may insist that it builds upon an assumption that is at least uncertain, and seems in some respects very dubious. And he may assert that in the religious consciousness at its best we have something that is very difficult to explain by the laws of general psychology." [2]

The function of the psychologist can be made clearer by reference to a subject kindred to religion. In the realm of aesthetics, it is no part of the psychologist's business to criticise individual opinion. The psychologist has nothing to say to the facts that my favourite painter is Turner, while he prefers Velasquez. On the other hand, he is strictly within his province when he investigates the sources of an aesthetic judgment. A has a passion for Wagner—but then he spent his honeymoon at Bayreuth. B considers Holbein the greatest painter of history—but his mother wrote a

[2] Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 *f.*

book on the art of Holbein. C regards Greek architecture as incomparable—but his father, since dead, took him to Athens when he was sixteen. The psychologist has obviously a right to point out that in such cases the aesthetic judgment is influenced by an unrecognised emotional bias. It is the same with religion. The psychologist has every right to investigate the degree to which a man's religious views conform to his general psychological make-up; the manner, for instance, in which these views serve to defend him from the uncongenial; the way in which they compensate for feelings of inferiority; the extent to which they provide a feeling of security from the menacing realities of life. The attack of modern psychology upon Christianity is largely directed against those aspects of it which are second-rate and extrinsic. The defence of Christianity will be successful only in so far as its champions join hands with the psychologists in a ruthless condemnation of all but the vital core of dynamic idealism which may confidently be expected to resist everything except "the will to disbelieve." When one contemplates the discrepancies between current Christian practice on the one

hand and the gospel of the Cross on the other, it is easy to see why the psychologist attacks the former in preference to the latter. In *Legends of Smokeover* Dr. Jacks makes one of his characters say: "The misconceptions about Jesus Christ are really scandalous. It is a terrible misfortune that the churches and the chapels have captured Him." When the preacher has grasped more fully these misconceptions, he will have made the first step towards assuring a successful defence of his position; just as the competent strategist begins by deciding what ground is essential to his purpose, and what positions are merely using up man-power to no useful purpose.

The content of religion can conveniently be classified under three headings:—

1. Demonstrable facts.
2. Non-demonstrable facts or dogma.
3. Subjective experience.

The line between the first and the second must necessarily be a varying one. A fact may appear historically established to one man, while another, with a keener critical sense, may consider that it is not so estab-

lished. The science of to-day may class as a miracle a phenomenon which will be accepted as natural by the scientists of to-morrow. Dogma may therefore be defined as the body of facts which cannot be objectively proved to the satisfaction of the individual to whose acceptance they are submitted.

Of the third group—subjective experience—the crucial characteristic is that of non-transmissibility. It is true that subjective experience can be suggested: but we shall see later that there are good grounds for discounting the religious value of mental states attained by this means.

It follows, therefore, that the psychological critic has nothing to say in regard to the first group, which involves merely matters of historical authenticity and objective validity in relation to purely intellectual processes. Of the second group we shall speak in a subsequent chapter (Chapter V). But the phenomena of subjective religious experience are open to—and should be open to—the most searching psychological criticism. They include the constant action and reaction of the great psychological ultimates: instincts and ideals. Academic psychology was wont to

spend itself on elaborate observations and theories of the will, the reason, perception, and many other mental processes. We shall do well to recognise that in the final reckoning we must always reduce our behaviour to a question of instinctive energy and ethical valuation.

Now, to the Freudian psycho-analyst, moral values originate exclusively in the social environment. Society, for its own comfort and security, has laid down an ethical code, which is impressed on the minds of the child and adolescent, and which is associated with ideas of rewards and punishments—some in this life and some in the next. A man, let us say, sees an opportunity to steal. The conflict, according to the Freudian School, is between his acquisitive instinct and the fear of consequences, social or religious, which he has been taught to associate with theft. Society, in order to ensure the sanctity of property, has instituted a penal treatment for the thief; and further, to enhance the fear thus created, it has invented the myth that the thief, even if he avoids detection upon earth, cannot escape the notice of an all-seeing God, who will inexorably punish him after

death more severely and more extensively than it would be possible for his fellow-creatures to do. To the Freudian, therefore, the conflict resolves itself into one between ego-centric impulses and the fear of consequences inculcated by society.

According to the conceptions of Jung and the Zürich School, man's unconscious is also capable of originating impulses of a noble and heroic kind : and therefore there is scope for conflict within the mind, even before the level of consciousness has been reached. There is, then, a difference at the very outset between these two analytical schools. On the other hand, the religious moralist would take a different standpoint. He would say that God had an absolute standard of right and wrong, and that, in so far as a man conforms to what he knows of this standard, it is accounted to him for righteousness. But no psychologist can be asked to accept this combination of a religion that professes, as Christianity does, to be a religion of motive, and not of conduct, with the inclusion of rewards and punishments in a system of idealism. The psychologist is bound to see in this combination a large measure of justification for the criticism of

sociologists and anthropologists and sceptical psycho-analysts, who trace to social exigencies the establishment of the penal code, and the emphasis on the resultant behaviour of the individual. However willingly he may admit a superhuman element of idealism, he is obliged, in the first place, to winnow out the human elements that the average partisan of religion is so ready to defend as an integral part of a divine system. The object of this book is to convince the Christian apologist that he will serve best the object that he has in view by an ungrudging and, if possible, unbiassed, co-operation in this task.

We shall do well, therefore, to make at once a preliminary survey of the problem, and to ask ourselves: What are the real sources of the religious dynamic? Some critics of religion reply at once that these sources are exclusively social; others reply that they are instinctive. Rigid theologians reply with equal certitude, and greater fervour, that they are divine. The psychological investigator will probably find that the religious dynamic arises partly from social influences, partly from inherent qualities in the individual, and partly from a third spring, which he will call

the racial unconscious, the Weldt-Geist, the Great Unknown or God, according to his conscious outlook or unconscious prejudice.

Let us begin with some quotations from modern psychologists. In the course of a discussion of the principal instincts of man McDougall writes as follows : [1]

> " Lightly to postulate an indefinite number and variety of human instincts is a cheap and easy way to solve psychological problems, and is an error hardly less serious and less common than the opposite error of ignoring all the instincts. How often do we not hear of the religious instinct ! . . . But, if we accept the doctrine of the evolution of man from animal forms, we are compelled to seek the origin of religious emotions and impulses in instincts that are not specifically religious. And consideration of the conditions, manifestations, and tendencies of religious emotions must lead to the same search. For it is clear that religious emotion is not a simple and specific variety, such as could be conditioned by any one instinct ; it is rather

[1] W. McDougall. *Social Psychology*, Fourteenth Edition, pp. 88 *f.*

a very complex and diversified product of the co-operation of several instincts, which bring forth very heterogeneous manifestations, differing from one another as widely as light from darkness, according to the degree and kind of guidance afforded by imagination and reason."

In *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life*, A. G. Tansley elaborates this theme of the instinctive origin of all conduct. On p. 267 he writes: "The instinct of human tenderness is the hope of the world—that and herd instinct in its most universal form." It is, perhaps, not irrelevant to point out here that, unfortunately for the world, this particular instinct has been ruled out entirely by no less a psychologist than A. F. Shand.

With commendable naïveté, Tansley puts his cards on the table, and formulates the dilemma that many modern psychologists seem to pass over with unconcern.

On p. 171 he says: "If we are right in supposing that the impulses to action are derived only from instinctive forces, it is clear that incompatible conations are certain to be initiated. What we need, then, is a selective agency which can choose between them, as

well as a force capable of inhibiting some, while giving free passage to others. Where are we to find such an agency?" Further on he provides his solution: "The ethical self not only gives the standard by which conduct is judged, it provides the necessary instinctive force required to enforce right conduct, to turn the other instincts to its purposes, to inhibit, where necessary, the conations which conflict with its standards." If modern psychology, in its dread of the metaphysical, is reduced to the hypothesis of an instinct emanating from an "ethical self," we may be excused if, in the interests of straight thinking, we prefer some less modern theories. Tansley having reduced conduct to a matter of instincts, then succumbs, like McDougall, to the opposite conception. "We must not underrate," he says, "the effect of ideals on the human mind, or (*sic*) the influence of great men on the herd mind." It appears, then, that the instinct of human tenderness is not the exclusive source of ethical conduct. Yet—despite this admission of the idealistic factor—Tansley adopts the standpoint of the determinist, as witness the following passage: "The doctrine of determinism in the psychic

sphere is merely a working hypothesis which fits the facts better than any other." We are reminded of a pertinent passage in Jacks' *Religious Perplexities*: "The traditional logic of the schools, on which this notion of rationality is founded, turns out on examination to cover no more than a departmental activity of the human mind. The type of conclusion to which it leads us is determined in advance by the rules it lays down for its own procedure, in the one department where such procedure is possible. Free activity, which is the essence of self-consciousness, and the life of all creative work, lies entirely outside its province, and the attempt to deal with it by departmental rules yields nothing but the rank absurdity that freedom itself is absurd. The logic in question may be compared to a locomotive engine which can move only on the rails that have been laid down for it, and the philosopher who would apprehend the things of the spirit by the means which it affords him is like a man who rides an engine rather than a horse when he goes to hunt a fox." (pp. 16 *f.*)

As against Tansley's somewhat bewildering simplications, we may put the view of Wilfred

Trotter. On p. 113 of his *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, he writes: "Religious feeling is therefore a character inherent in the very structure of the human mind, and is the expression of a need which must be recognised by the biologist as neither superficial nor transitory. It must be admitted that some philosophers and men of science have at times denied to the religious impulses of man their true dignity and importance. Impelled, perhaps, by a desire to close the circle of a materialistic conception of the universe, they have tended to belittle the significance of such phenomena as they were unable to reconcile with their principles and bring within the iron circle of their doctrine. To deal with religion in this way has not only been an outrage upon true scientific method, but has always led to a strong reaction in general opinion against any radical inquiry by science into the deeper problems of man's nature and status. A large and energetic reaction of this kind prevails to-day. There can be little doubt that it was precipitated, if not provoked, by attempts to force a harsh and dogmatic materialism into the status of a general philosophy. As long as such a system is compelled

to ignore, depreciate, or to deny the reality of such manifestly important phenomena as the altruistic emotions, the religious needs and feelings, the experiences of awe and wonder and beauty, the illumination of the mystic, the rapture of the prophet, the unconquerable endurance of the martyr, so long must it fail in its claims to universality. It is therefore necessary to lay down with the strongest emphasis the proposition that the religious needs and feelings of man are a direct and necessary manifestation of the inheritance of instinct with which he is born, and therefore deserve consideration as respectful and observation as minute as any other biological phenomenon." And on p. 124: "Throughout the incalculable ages of man's existence as a social animal, Nature has been hinting to him in less and less ambiguous terms that altruism must become the ultimate sanction of his moral code. Her whispers have never gained more than grudging and reluctant notice from the common man, and from those intensified forms of the common man, his pastors and masters. Only to the alert senses of moral genius has the message been at all intelligible, and when it has been interpreted

to the people, it has always been received with obloquy and derision, with persecution and martyrdom. Thus, as so often happens in human society, has one manifestation of herd instinct been met and opposed by another."

Trotter spells Nature with a capital: he recognises that "altruism must be the ultimate sanction," but in its dynamic form idealism must be reduced to a manifestation of Herd Instinct. This point will be dealt with more fully in Chapter VIII. Meantime, we must content ourselves by pointing out that there is a form of scientific courage which frankly admits an unknown factor; which recognises the limitations of its sphere; and which makes no attempt to solve a problem in two dimensions in terms of one dimension only. Admirable as is the true scientific spirit which attacks the unknown with indomitable patience and inexhaustible resource, it ceases to be admirable when the impulse to explain and to unify becomes a complex, and unconsciously influences rational processes. We shall have much to say in subsequent chapters about the unconscious motives that originate certain religious reactions. It may not be out of place to point out here that the

critic of religion is also liable to be biassed by unconscious motives. In the first place, everyone who sets out to establish the doctrine of determinism has an initial interest, probably repressed, in the success of his attempt to disprove the "illusion of human spontaneity." For when he has satisfied himself on logical grounds that his freewill is but a childish phantasy, he has necessarily cut out of his life the factor of moral responsibility, and therefore of ethical conation. The Freudian School has shown us very plainly what a passionate interest mankind possesses in this disproof of a metaphysical conception which constitutes the basis of all religions. The scientific impulse can readily associate itself in certain individuals with this desire to eliminate the category of freewill, and the scientist may thus become the victim of a motive, the nature of which is by no means admitted in his own consciousness, and the result of which must inevitably be detrimental to the straightness of his thinking. If Christianity offers mankind both an unattained ideal and a permanent possibility of a higher adjustment to that ideal, it is easy to see that the logical and biological man could save

himself much trouble and effort by reducing idealism to terms of instinctive energy. Therefore, let it be quite clear that the upholders of religion have no monopoly of complexes and repressions, and that the standpoint of science is no adequate guarantee of unbiassed thinking nor of disinterested logic.

Rudyard Kipling knows human nature better than most scientists, and we would commend to the notice of a few " scientific " psychologists his admirable epigram : " Man is an imperfectly denatured animal, intermittently subject to the unpredictable reactions of an unlocated spiritual area." This may not help us very positively in our attempt to determine the sources of the religious dynamic, but it confirms, at any rate, our contention that the modern attempt to reduce idealism in general, and religious reactions in particular, to instinctive activity is inadequate and futile.

L. P. Jacks, who may well command the attention of all serious thinkers, says : " There is a coward and a hero in the breast of every man. Each of the pair has a ' logic ' of his own adapted to his particular purpose and aim —which is safety for the coward and victory

for the hero. The two are perpetually at variance, the reason of the one being the unreason of the other, the truth of the one being the falsehood of the other. The inner strife, the division in our nature, the law in our members warring against the law of our mind, on which so many great doctrines of religion have hinged, has its origin at this point. Anyone who watches himself narrowly may observe the strife going on, and going on in just this form, as an argument between the coward within him, who is out for safety, and the hero within him, who is out for victory. They have little common ground, and can barely understand each other's speech." [1] The Freudian psycho-analyst, in criticising such a passage, would doubtless interpret the coward and the hero as two categories of impulses; the coward as animal instincts which deserve a better name; the hero as ethical conceptions derived from his social environment, and endowed with moral value by a society which in so doing has its own interests to serve. But there are other views besides those of Freud and the Vienna School. Jung of Zürich would also accept

[1] L. P. Jacks. *Religious Perplexities*, pp. 18 *f.*

these two categories, and while admitting, no doubt, the social origin of some elements on either side, would explain the residue of impulses—alike cowardly and heroic—as deriving in the first place from the Racial Unconscious. As the racial unconscious represents the sum total of the past experiences of the race, it must necessarily contain elements both egocentric and altruistic. Jung's conception is, of course, a purely metaphysical one, and as such has incurred criticism from other schools of psycho-analysis : but it may certainly be said to land us in fewer rational morasses than is the case with some of the more biological theories. It may be that his theory is too simple : but, at any rate, Jung has a very direct answer to the question : " Whence comes the religious dynamic ? "

In point of fact, science and metaphysics must unite to answer the question. For this purpose the scientific doctrine of evolution must be used by the metaphysician. It is the metaphysician's business, after all, to show that the universe is rational, that it is " a cosmos and not a chaos," and in doing so he will have to start with the scientist's theory of evolution. He should be able to prove that

a world, evolving spiritually as well as materially, demands that man's subjective conviction of freewill be accepted as fundamentally valid, and that the theologian's conception of "conscience" corresponds, in fact, to a capacity of moral valuation inherent in man, independent of—though necessarily enhanced by—external social influences. On this subject more will be said in the following chapter; but reference must be made to the very important point involved as to ethical values in the unconscious. Jung's theory practically implies this. On the other hand, Pratt very emphatically reminds us that "the subconscious contains evil as well as good, or, rather, it contains neither the one nor the other, but the materials for both. Only conscious personality is moral—nothing is morally good except a good will." [1]

Passing now from the question of the source of the religious dynamic, let us study briefly various common attitudes to religion. There are three main orientations to religion. The first consists in "eliminating the category of the infinite." On the whole, pure materialism and atheism are uncommon. They are

[1] Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 52.

found amongst scientists—but rarely of the first rank—among half-baked philosophers, and the rebel sons of close Plymouth Brethren. The psychologist will find ample reward for the time spent in investigating the complexes of such individuals. Far more important is the vast multitude of those who regard religion as a sort of hobby—harmless and unessential —and perhaps to be encouraged for women and children. This " indifferent " class suffers not so much from crooked thinking as from no thinking at all. Christianity, as presented to the masses for many centuries, has emphatically discouraged thinking. It has depended on creeds, on ritual, on repetitions, on historical knowledge, on mass suggestion, on phantasies of material well-being—in fact, on anything except clear thinking. The critics very justifiably have pointed out this fact. They have inferred with painful accuracy that institutionalised Christianity feared independent thought. Perhaps the Quakers are the only body—and they cannot be called institutionalised—against whom the allegation cannot justly be made—certainly until recent times. When the churches initiate a campaign of straight thinking, an improvement may be

expected. Meantime, the majority of these indifferentists, in so far as it thinks at all, suffers from mild repressions of a very obvious order. With them, it is not a question of ideals *versus* instincts, nor of freewill *versus* determinism, but something much more superficial. Mr. Jones is a churchwarden, and overworks his employés, *ergo*, " I'm fed up with these church-going hypocrites " becomes the satisfying rationalisation that keeps in the unconscious the true motive : " If I took to church-going, I suppose I should have to give up my Sunday golf." Such trivial repressions are sufficient to deflect from the straight course thinking that is so feeble and shallow.

The third attitude is that of regarding religion as a vital human function—a function as precious as eyesight, as jealously to be protected, as essential to a full life. But while such an attitude may satisfy the preacher, the psychologist must needs investigate it ; for in not a few cases he will find that religion is prized on grounds that are essentially egocentric : in the form in which it is practised, it satisfies some unworthy desire, or it makes its appeal, not to the hero, but to the coward in him. It is perhaps not going too far to

say that the religious bodies which will flourish in the future are those that are most ready to submit the ardent loyalties and burning devotion of their members to the most searching analytical tests.

Finally, we may conclude this chapter by formulating a few tests which the psychologist feels justified in applying to any given manifestation of religion :—

1. How far does it refer moral responsibility to the individual, and how far to authority ?

2. How far is it objective in its values, and how far subjective ?

3. How far is it based upon idealism, and how far upon fear ?

4. How far is it interested and how far disinterested ? Does it, for instance, fail if dissociated from the conception of eternal life, rewards, etc. ?

5. How far is it a religion of tradition, and how far of vision ?

6. How far is it static, and how far dynamic ?

7. How far does it present an ideal attained in the past, and how far an unattained ideal ?

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION AND THE RELIGION OF EVOLUTION

Synopsis

Aversion of many Christian apologists to the discussion of the history of religion.
Religious impulses of primitive peoples.
Conception of immortality.
The fear of ostracism.
Conflict between claims of the Herd and claims of the Individual.
Social demands supported by penal codes.
Place of historical, pragmatic and intellectual factors in religious impulse.
The sense of progress.
Evolution in modern Christianity.
The power principle of biology. The love principle of the Gospels.
Attitude of certain schools towards the original doctrine of evolution.
The progressive tendency in the development of the individual's religious orientation.
Principles which make for an evolutionary process in the moral sphere.

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION AND THE RELIGION OF EVOLUTION

A FAMOUS Scottish ecclesiastic in the crisis of a momentous controversy, used the following words in addressing the General Assembly of his Church :—" Remember," he said, " that the facts, if they are facts, are God's facts." It would be well for religion if more of its champions sincerely maintained this attitude towards truth. The converse is illustrated by the story of the old lady faced for the first time by the theories of Darwin : " Descended from monkeys ? My dear, I trust that it is not true ; but if it is, let us pray that it may not become widely known." *Mutatis mutandis*, the same is being said to-day about analytical psychology and sex. Many Christian apologists show a distinct aversion to the discussion of the history of religion. They are willing to compare, let us say, Confucianism of to-day with Christianity of to-day,

confident of their ability to establish the ethical superiority of the latter. But they dislike comparisons being drawn between the virgin birth of Jesus and the miraculous advents of many other saints, gods and heroes, from Hiawatha upwards. They will talk at length about the Old Testament blood symbols and the Christian blood symbol; but they will be annoyed if it is pointed out that Mithraism constitutes a logical link between the two in this respect.[1]

Again, they regard the use of water in the Christian rite of baptism as something standing by itself, and object to comparisons with similar purification rites in any pre-Christian system. They regard as a blasphemer anyone who would associate the story of David and Goliath with that of Jack the Giantkiller. In short, they have a water-tight bulkhead which divides the sacred from the secular. This attitude is prompted by a more or less unconscious fear that Christianity may be discredited if its origin be shown to be more

[1] The Old Testament use of blood was a purely external thing, in which it was the blood of an animal that was used for sprinkling the altar, etc. In Mithraism, the blood of the animal (the bull) had to fall direct on the person of the initiate. In Christian symbolism it is the blood of the Redeemer that has to be absorbed by the disciple.

humble than they would represent. In point of fact, their much-vaunted "faith" does not go the length of believing that the gospel of the Cross can endure in the conflict. In this connection, it is perhaps not irrelevant to quote a passage from an ecclesiastical trial of last century, in which the right of free criticism in religion was vindicated. Professor Robertson Smith used these words: "Dr. Begg has told us that he is trembling for the ark of God . . . I know but one character in the Bible who trembled for the ark of God, and that was Eli . . . a worldly ecclesiastic, who trembled because for him it had ceased to be a shrine of the living, revealing word of God, and had become a fetish. As he trembled, he fell and perished. But the ark was safe, because it was the ark of God's revelation. No man need tremble for that."

Let us, then, feel no squeamishness, still less anxiety, in examining the origins of modern Christianity, remembering that, after all—as William James reminds us—"it is by their fruits ye shall know them, not by their roots."

Conflict first came into man's life as conflict

with the forces of nature. His first religious impulses were the outcome of his fear of extinction. The attacks of wild beasts, thunder and lightning, prompted him to pray for protection, no doubt in phrases very similar to those which are repeated week by week in the Litany of the Church of England. As he became hunter, the instinct of self-preservation would prompt him to set up a God of hunting, and to pray for good fortune in the chase. Gradually, the instinct of self-preservation became extended to that of race-preservation, and the conflict with nature involved the idea of fertility, whence emerged phallic worship in its earliest forms. But the fear of extinction would enlarge itself, as man's imagination developed, into the longing for personal survival after death. As man recognised his impotence to ensure welfare after bodily death, he was driven by this longing to set up an unseen mechanism through which he might ensure his spirit against extinction. Thus we see that the conception of immortality corresponds with one of the most primitive of man's desires, and no religious system could offer a reward more fundamentally attractive than the life everlasting. Therefore, to regard

man's high valuation of eternal life as an evidence of a divine impulse is wholly unnecessary. It is perfectly primitive and reflects no sort of credit upon him. It is merely proof of his enlarged psychic life, of his newly acquired faculty of imagination, and of his dawning capacity for abstraction. At the same time, this fact has no bearing whatsoever on the possibility, probability or certainty of an after-life. Sceptics have again and again committed the fallacy of disproving the possibility of survival after death by proving the primitive character of man's craving for it, and by pointing out the psychological mechanism of projection whereby he endeavours to objectify his phantasies. A little child passionately desired a fine day for his birthday picnic. Accordingly, he prayed intently for it. When the day came, it turned out fine. The adult recognises a purely egocentric impulse expressing itself in a phantasy mechanism whereby it attributed the fine weather to its own prayers, addressed to the God who was apparently willing to disregard the prayers of the devout farmers who were simultaneously praying for rain. We recognise that the weather was in no way

determined by the child's wish, nor yet by its prayers. But it would have been peculiarly illogical to predict on the eve of the birthday that the weather would be bad because the child's prayers were a mere phantasy-formation, created by a primitive wish. The analogy is not unfair. The sceptics who discredit on a psychological basis the conception of immortality are no less illogical. It is a good Aristotelian principle that a thing can be understood best in its most highly developed form. On the other hand, those who see in man's desire for survival evidence of a spiritual dynamic are building on a very unsure foundation.

As man developed his gregarious character, the area of conflict was still further enlarged. Ostracism became a possibility likely to involve extinction, and therefore the necessity of maintaining good relations with his immediate herd became a matter of paramount importance. Hence the sacredness of property, the sacredness of life, and the sacredness of marriage ties came to be established. The individual had to learn that his acquisitive instinct had to be inhibited, lest the seizure of his neighbour's property should result in his

being ostracised from the community, and in his being bereft of that social support which implied relative security of life. Hence the fear of extinction is the origin of that ineradicable subservience to social opinion which is—no doubt rightly—described by Trotter and most modern psychologists as the herd instinct. It is easy to see how the primitive social group was forced to set up its communal code : how the adults would promulgate that code to the younger members ; and how, to impress the lessons on the children, legends and allegories would be created, each containing its message of social responsibility. So the stories of Cain and Abel, of Jacob and Esau would originate to teach the sacredness of life and property, and to inspire the children with a wholesome fear of transgression. The sexual code would have many illustrative legends. To this category belong the stories of the destruction of Sodom, of Onan, and many others. In this connection, it is very interesting to note that the Bible story begins with Adam and Eve. Man's sexual self-consciousness was the first step in the creation of human society ; marriage was sacred before life and property—or so it would appear from

the book of Genesis. And with that sexual self-consciousness, there arose the concern for the future of the herd and the safeguarding of procreation by putting obstacles in the way of the sexual expression of the immature. The direct lineal descendant of this very primitive attitude is the conventional prudery which leads pious parents of to-day to shelter their children from sex knowledge as being essentially contaminating.

Thus we see how, at a very early period in his social history, man must have recognised the conflict between the claims of the herd and the claims of the individual, and how, in order to support social demands, he devised, not only penal codes of a real and immediate nature, but also penal codes projected on to gods, spirits and demons. The necessity for consolidating the social group is a perfectly adequate explanation of much that remains attached to the Christian religion. Propagandism and group domination serve the purposes of the herd so effectively that they die hard, even where men preach the freedom of the Cross. Yet their origins are of the earth, earthy. Islam alone has excelled Christianity in using a central spiritual truth for the

purposes of herd consolidation and herd domination.

Dr. Inge has said that religion without history is a nervous disease. Epigrams, even Dr. Inge's, serve their end best when they are not taken too literally. It is obvious that history, particularly that of the Old Testament, can contribute a very necessary element to man's religious outlook, while he who shuts his eyes to history and science when he might profit from them may pictorially be said to be suffering from a nervous disease. Nevertheless, " holiness does not depend on history." If we were to accept the Dean's aphorism literally we should be admitting that the only source of a genuine religious dynamic is historical, and therefore intellectual. This is inadmissible. It will be argued later on that the religious impulse in man is primarily affective, and that historical, pragmatic and intellectual factors, however valuable they may be, must, in the end, be regarded as secondary. Tracing the development of modern religion from its most primitive sources, the Christian apologist sees the working of God's will, and the revelation of Himself to man. The sociologist sees the pene-

trating demands of the human group, presenting themselves in more and more subtle, yet inexorable forms. The psycho-analyst sees the endless self-deceptions of the human mind in adjusting biological craving to environmental expediency. But the evolutionist may perhaps see more than these. He may see a process of social development comparable to biological development. According to biological evolution, types which are better adapted to their environment displace those types which are in this respect inferior. In social evolution, he sees societies better organised, better consolidated, and better adjusted to their environment displacing or absorbing societies which are in these respects their inferiors. He sees the conception of *progress* asserting itself—perhaps not uninterruptedly, but at any rate in the main wherever there is life. Now if he submit his own mental life to a rigid scrutiny, he will find there a sense of progress. Much of this is attributable to experience, human teaching, and social standards. But deep down he will come upon something inherent which he will be able to trace to no external influence ; something as inherent as our consciousness of physical

motion ; something which can—like the sense of motion—be deceived ; something which, like that sense, derives support for itself from many extraneous sources ; something which, nevertheless, defies the attempt to explain it away in its entirety.

A small boy climbs a tree. Having been detected, he is forbidden by his father to repeat the dangerous performance. His mother urges him not to waste time on tree-climbing, but to play with his companions, which is much better form. She may add as a final argument that he has never seen his father climb a tree. His nurse says she wishes he were a little gentleman with some respect for his clothes. Now he had never seen anyone else climb that tree, nor had he ever previously been forbidden to do so ; and though he may in future desist from the mere pressure of social opinion and adult authority, yet he knows with an inner conviction which nothing can shake that in climbing that tree he was progressing. He knows it partly because he was somewhat frightened at the outset, partly because he experienced a feeling of triumph at the conclusion, partly because he knew all along that the self-appointed task called into

play all his mental and physical resources. It is perhaps difficult for adults to find in their own experience instances of this conviction of progressive reaction independent of educational, social and moral standards. Therefore it is relatively easy for the sceptical psychologist to represent what is called " conscience " as the voice of the herd in one form or another, demanding the subordination of a personal impulse. Nevertheless, it is submitted that deep down in each one of us, buried at times beneath a mass of acquired morality, there is this sense of progress. Some psychologists would, no doubt, identify it with desire for conation and achievement. It seems to be a wider thing than these in that it covers non-conative activity as well. Just as swimming is a conative achievement, so floating is attained only by relaxation. This sense of progress includes reactions both of the conation and surrender types. Now some psychologists would interpret this sense of progress as the child's conception of growing up. Let us, for the sake of argument, accept this, and regard the inherent sense of progress as an aspect of the urge to maturity. The evolutionist would be able to correlate this with that

urge of maturity which he has observed in the biological sphere. The psychologist is then bound to admit—what he may never have attempted to deny—that in the psychic sphere there is an innate, as apart from an acquired, disposition to value progressive or mature reactions above regressive or puerile reactions. If we take this view of it, we must ask ourselves whether the innate recognition of progress is limited by the standard of maturity of the individual's own group ; and if so, why ? The evolutionist has seen in the biological world an impulse to development carrying the individual—occasionally, if not frequently—beyond the limits of past attainment. Is it reasonable that in face of the analogy he should regard the psychic factor of progress merely as an imitative thing, bounded by the standard of the past ? On the other hand, it seems perfectly reasonable to surmise that the parallelism is complete, and that, just as evolution in biology and sociology is marching on to future forms unrevealed at present, so in man's mind and spirit there is a progressive movement towards a goal hitherto unattained. In this movement lies the religious dynamic ; in the innate sensitiveness to it lies the

nucleus of the religious conscience; in the recognition of a divine scale of value lies the admission of development, potential, though unattained.

It has been pointed out in a previous chapter that analytical psychology, like Christianity, stresses the motive, rather than the action. It is important at this stage to realise that society has only an indirect interest in the individual's motives. In so far as it is possible or logical to consider the social outlook in contradistinction to that of the individuals comprising it, we may say that society demands from the individual conformity to its code, whereby the ends of social stability and prosperity are served. Society, *qua* society, has no interest in the method of attaining these ends, and tends to favour a penal system which generally produces the most rapid results. Hence the burden of social morality always has been, and perhaps always will be, that it pays the individual to behave, and it does not pay him to misbehave. It is true that society has seen in the gospel of altruism an excellent adjuvant to its penal methods. It has said, "If you will be unselfish, you will be rewarded by having a com-

fortable feeling in this world and a halo in the next." But we must clearly differentiate in our minds between social influences which are only interested in results and the spark of progressiveness in the individual which values motives for their own sakes. If we are right in ascribing to the individual an urge towards unlimited psychological maturity, then he will do certain things which are contrary to his own immediate interests as a heroic reaction to a challenge, while society may be inducing him to do these same things for fear of punishment or in hope of reward. This subject will be more fully considered in Chapter VIII.

It follows, therefore, that in so far as modern Christianity is to be a religion of evolution it must purge itself of the mass of purely social conceptions with which it is at present hampered. It must represent the interests not of society existent and secular, but of a society unseen and unborn. It must refuse to voice the claim of the majority that conduct is paramount and motive subsidiary. It must be prepared to stand by the individual who, in a sincere attempt to respond to the challenge of the Cross, finds himself offending the

vested interests of the dominant or the selfish claims of the majority. The psychologist, if he has any interest in history, must see in its pages countless examples of this antagonism. He must see how society has again and again rebelled when organised religion yielded to an onward, evolutionary movement. He must see how the institution has repeatedly been forced to serve the objective ends of society at the expense of progressive individuation. If he be a sceptic, he will find in the subservience of institutionalised religion many arguments for discrediting the alleged source of the religious impulse. But if he be sufficiently open-minded, he will recognise an evolutionary urge which, despite social influences, and not in response to them, has impelled men and women to react to stimulus in a way that provoked social hostility at the time, whereas later generations would have accepted such reactions as normal or praiseworthy.

Now the fundamental reason why society finds itself in conflict with the progressive individual is this. Social evolution has turned on the principle of power ; Christianity introduces a new principle—that of love. Society is therefore challenged to substitute for the

power principle of biology, the love principle of the gospels. Obviously this may imply a loss of immediate efficiency; hence he who preaches a transvaluation for social purposes is liable to incur disapproval. But slowly the change is occurring. How far it can go is a matter of academic speculation. Some there are who, like Dr. Inge, regard Christianity as intrinsically a religion of minorities, liable to lose its meaning so soon as it has absorbed the regressive environment which called forth its characteristic reactions. Be that as it may, enough has, it is hoped, been said to show that individual progress must be regarded in the light of evolution. In this connection, it is interesting and relevant to study the attitude of certain schools towards the original doctrine of evolution.

The churches in general, and the Evangelical wing of the Anglican Church in particular, exhibited intense hostility to evolution at the outset. The causes are fairly obvious to us to-day. The scientists claimed much that they could not prove. Most of them inferred from these discoveries that materialism was the only tenable philosophy of life. The religious apologists, on the other hand, were

groping feebly in a morass of traditional obscurantism, and perceived in the new science a dangerous attempt to discredit the Creator. To-day the doctrine of biological evolution is accepted, in word at least, by practically all schools of religious thought. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the authoritarian denominations are faced with a troublesome philosophic dilemma. It is obvious that the acceptance of evolution as a valid biological principle, may lead sooner or later to the analogy which has been outlined in this chapter, namely, that between biological and moral evolution. It is also obvious that, if in the moral sphere the supreme value is "What the Church in all ages has held," there can be no admission of an unattained or unrevealed supreme value. This subject will be further dealt with in the following chapter. If we turn to the attitude of the analysts, we find a very illuminating divergence between the schools of Vienna and Zürich. Freud has had the courage of his convictions, and followed his deterministic assumption to its logical end. That end he finds to be—as many philosophers would have foretold—extinction.

In a recent paper [1] he develops the thesis that " an instinct would be an innate tendency in living organic matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition—" namely, the condition of inanimate inertia. " If, then, all organic instincts are conservative, historically acquired, and are directed towards regression, towards reinstatement of something earlier, we are obliged to place all the results of organic development to the credit of external, disturbing and distracting influences. The rudimentary creature would from its very beginning not have wanted to change, would, if circumstances had remained the same, have always merely repeated the same course of existence. But in the last resort it must have been the evolution of our earth, and its relation to the sun, that has left its imprint on the development of organisms. The conservative organic instincts have absorbed every one of these enforced alterations in the course of life and have stored them for repetition ; they thus present the delusive appearance of forces striving after change and progress, while they are merely endeavouring to reach an old goal by ways both old and new.

[1] S. Freud. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* 1922, pp. 44 *ff* 1.

This final goal of all organic striving can be stated too. It would be counter to the conservative nature of instinct if the goal of life were a state never hitherto reached. It must be rather an ancient starting point, which the living being left long ago, and to which it harks back again by all the circuitous paths of development. If we may assume as an experience, admitting of no exception, that everything living dies from causes within itself, and returns to the inorganic, we can only say, '*The goal of all life is death*,' and, casting back, '*The inanimate was there before the animate*.' "

Of the conclusions reached by following this line of thought, Freud says, with his persistent honesty: "I do not know how far I believe in them." (p. 76). In a previous chapter reference was made to Tansley's dictum that determinism was the hypothesis that "best fitted the facts." It appears, however, that determinism, when honestly thought out, will not fit the doctrine of evolution in any sphere. Without discussing the criticisms which Freud's argument arouses from the side of biology and philosophy, we may quote a comment made by the Editor of the *British*

Journal of Medical Psychology[1] (Dr. T. W. Mitchell): "The pessimism which hangs like a cloud over the whole of this essay is perhaps the inevitable outcome of a belief, however achieved, in a mechanistic theory of life; and perhaps the criticism which will, in the end, invalidate Freud's arguments, may come, not from those who dispute the accuracy of his deductions, but from those who question the fundamental assumption on which all his reasoning rests—the assumption that all the phenomena of life and mind can be interpreted in terms of the physical sciences. Freud has invoked the myth of Aristophanes in aid of his speculations; is it permissible to appeal to the other myth in the Symposium, the Discourse of Diotima? 'What, then, is Eros? Is he Mortal? Nay, Mortal he verily is not.'"

The Freudian School has no place for the conception of creative evolution, except as an interesting specimen of illusion. "Indeed, from the standpoint of scientific thought," writes Dr. Ernest Jones, "the abstract idea [of the divine creative power] . . . is altogether illusory; we have no experience, in either the

[1] Vol. III., Part 3, 1923.

physical or spiritual world, of creation, for what masquerades as such always proves on closer inspection to be only transformation. Yet so hard is it for the human mind to rid itself of such fundamental illusions that the necessity of postulating a creative force is one of the chief arguments adduced in favour of a belief in theism, and even relatively sceptical thinkers like Herbert Spencer feel obliged to fall back on the conception of a First Cause." [1]

If we turn now to the Zürich view, we find Jung expressing himself thus : " It was of the most profound psychological significance when Christianity first discovered in the orientation towards the future a redeeming principle for mankind." [2] In accordance with this view, the Zürich School consistently regards the psychological problems of the individual as related to an adjustment to the future, as well as to influences in the past.

The contrast between Freud's and Jung's teachings is excellently described by Van der Hoop in his *Character and the Unconscious*, pp. 128 f. " I have attempted to show that

[1] Ernest Jones. *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*. Revised Edition, 1920, pp. 175 *f*.

[2] C. G. Jung. *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, p. 277.

there are two entirely different methods of interpreting dreams. How can we decide which is the right one ? They seem to represent two entirely different points of view, two opposed outlooks on life. The answer should be that both are right, but that neither of them can contain the whole truth, and that they cannot be brought into harmony with each other, because each points in a different direction. It is like two men on a road, one always looking forward, the other backward. Each sees a different landscape, and their description of the road will be true in either case, yet entirely different. The attitude of each patient towards his own problems must determine whether we should interpret his symbolism chiefly from a prospective or from a retrospective point of view. Any ideas associated with the dream-symbols will also naturally influence our interpretation, and this association-method will often reveal a tendency in the dreamer to compensate for the narrowness of his conscious views of life. But the psychologist who relies entirely upon the purely scientific point of view, and is only concerned with the retrospective side of dream-symbolism, is in great danger of

misinterpreting the meaning of a dream in which prospective symbolism predominates."

The Book of Genesis contains a familiar legend of two people on one road who adopted opposed orientations. Whatever was the ultimate outcome of Lot's prospective orientation, we are taught that his wife's retrospective orientation resulted in crystallisation. The truth herein symbolised seems somewhat pertinent. Used by society for its own ends, Christianity has deteriorated into a crystalline preservative.

Thus we see that this evolutionary outlook in philosophy constitutes a most interesting line of division. If the harmonising of science and religion is destined to take place over this conception, then there will be barred from that concord the Freudian psycho-analysts and the authoritarian apologists—truly a strange combination.

Finally, it is necessary to specify more precisely the implications of this progressive tendency in the relations of the individual himself. There are three main positions tenable with regard to reaction and environment : (1) The determinist regards environment as insusceptible of influence, while reaction being

predetermined, is uninfluenced by will ; (2) the childish attitude is that religion constitutes a mechanism whereby environment can be altered (by prayer) in a sense favourable to the suppliant, so that a given reaction will not be so difficult ; (3) the adult attitude is—or should be—that religion provides an idealistic dynamic whereby his reaction to any given environment may be progressive, rather than regressive.

The first position is that of all materialists and determinists. The second is that of children and primitive people. The third is that of adults—in the psychological sense. To change the second attitude into the third is the function of development in the individual's religious orientation. There can be no progressive movement while religious interest is centred upon environment (and this term includes in its scientific sense the individual's own body as part of his environment psychologically considered). So long as he uses religion as a phantasy of material protection, so long as he seeks first the fulfilment of his physical desires, so long as he covets the *palma sine pulvere*—just so long will he remain " tame in earth's paddock as her prize."

Religion begins where man, recognising the conflict between himself and his environment, attempts to find a solution on supernatural lines. Christianity begins when man outgrows his childish phantasies of well-being and security, and substitutes for the magical solutions of pre-Christian religion the solution of conflict by transvaluation, with all the cost in heroism and endurance that the process implies :

> " And where we looked for crowns to fall
> We find the tug's to come—that's all—"

—and if it isn't " all," it is so nearly " all " as to rule out of the Christian category a vast amount of religion that parades as Christianity to-day. Sir George Adam Smith says : " History is strewn with the errors of those who have sought from God something else than Himself. All the degradation even of our highest religions has sprung from this : that their votaries forgot that religion was communion with God Himself . . . and employed it as mere communication either of material benefits or of intellectual ideas." Carlyle says : " It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true things and vindicate himself under

God's heaven as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs."

It would seem, then, that from varied quarters there is substantial evidence for the thesis that in Christianity rightly interpreted there is a progressive principle, and in man a progressive impulse, which together make possible an evolutionary process in the moral sphere.

CHAPTER IV

PROPHET AND PRIEST: VISION AND TRADITION

Synopsis

Tendency of prophet and priest types to manifest themselves in all human affairs.
Importance of these types in the study of religion.
Identification of priest with Herd—past and present.
Prophet, the servant of posterity.
Priest leans to the objective while the prophet lives in a subjective world.
Temperamental repressions of each type.
Chief distinction the difference between the attained and the unattained ideal.
Unconscious bias of the prophet.
Vision and tradition may both be subject of propaganda.
For the priest standardisation. For the prophet differentiation.
St. Paul as a propagandist.
Progressive or regressive influence of propagandists.

PROPHET AND PRIEST: VISION AND TRADITION

IN all human affairs the distinction corresponding to the prophet type and the priest type tends to manifest itself; progressives or reactionaries, liberals or conservatives, in business and politics, in education and religion, they are ever with us. And this must necessarily be so. The creative impulse and forward outlook of the one type must conflict with the groove tendency and retrospective attitude of the other. Yet both elements have a function to fulfil. The craft without a sail gets nowhere; the boat without a keel capsizes. Racial experience makes for stability and stagnation; new ideas bring instability with progress. If you stone the prophets you have Judaism; if you slay the priests you have "Bolshevism."

These two opposed psychological dispositions are of such primary importance in the study of religion that we may dwell on them

at some length. The prophet, in the first place, tends to be an intuitive and creative type; to him logic and reason are of little account in the face of impulse and intuition.

On the other hand, the priest tends to be logical and rational (or at least believes that he is); he despises the prophet as unpractical; he may be a cold and dispassionate intellectual, or a fervent, passionate partisan. His prudence may be dictated by genuine and disinterested anxiety to safeguard society, or, perhaps, by his own interests, if they be threatened. He is insensitive to new ideas, partly because they might cause pain, and partly because he cannot see whither they are leading. He may be a talker, possibly he is a thinker, but never a seer. Ruskin says: "Hundreds of people can talk for one who can think, but thousands can think for one who can see." And Mrs. Browning has expressed the same idea in the familiar couplet:

> "But only those who see take off their shoes,
> The rest sit round it and eat blackberries."

The prophet tends to be an auto-suggestionist, while the priest is generally a hetero-suggestionist. Or let us say that they both tend to

act or think without adequate rational justification. The prophet suggests to himself the adequacy of his new vision ; the priest accepts the suggestion of his environment that the existing order cannot be improved on. The prophet, valuing immediate experience very highly, despises the priest whose pedestrian mind satisfies itself with mediate experience. The priest reaches his optimism through the well-known formula : " What was good enough for my father is good enough for me, and what is good enough for me should be good enough for you, young man." But the prophet realises that " We must win our optimism at the sword's point " (Jacks). The priest abides by a loyalty that may be of outstanding nobility ; the prophet accepts a dynamic that loyalties cannot confine. To the priest his creed is sanctified by its past; to the prophet his vision is guaranteed by its spontaneity. The priest consciously or unconsciously is a pragmatist ; he condemns the new idea because he has no evidence that it will work ; to the prophet pragmatic values do not exist. The priest is concerned to maintain the identification between himself and his herd—present and past ; but the

prophet is the servant of posterity—its verdict alone carries weight with him ; what if his contemporaries slay him—they cannot exterminate his message.

And in this identification the priest is not merely, or necessarily, obeying selfish impulses. He sees society with difficulty maintaining its stability and solidity. He knows only too well the disruptive effects of fanaticism ; he rightly conceives it his duty—nay, his sacred trust—to conserve all that was good in the past, and he generally fulfils this duty by maintaining that all that belongs to the past is good. The attained ideal is perfectly sufficient for him, and in obedience to the repetitive tendency of his type he reiterates previous formulations from the Lord's Prayer to the Athanasian Creed, while he multiplies saints and heroes as objectifying the attained ideal. The prophet is temperamentally intolerant of all this. By mere repetition a form loses for him its original worth. The good men of the past have no interest for him in comparison with the potential saints yet to be converted or even born. The Italians have a proverb : "*Il meglio é nemico del bene*"—the better is an enemy of the good. This expresses the priest's outlook,

but the prophet would turn the proverb round, and say : " *Il bene é nemico del meglio.*"

It follows that the priest leans to the objective, while the prophet lives in a subjective world. The priest stresses behaviour, while the prophet emphasizes motive. The symbols that the prophet gives to the race, become, in the hands of the priest, realities, idols or fetishes, while allegories and parables turn into historical truth.

Pratt (*The Religious Consciousness*, p.-19) sums up the situation with great justice : " Not without reason has the Church always feared every popular outbreak of mysticism. He who has experienced the Divine within his own heart is likely to hold all formalism and tradition unnecessary or cheap, if not misleading or even diabolic. This confidence in its own all-sufficing inner light, and the intense joy of the experience, have been the two great dangers of excessive mysticism, when not balanced by a suitable respect for the inherited wisdom of the race, and never inhibited by the restraining hand of a cool and sober reason." It must be obvious from what has been said already that the temperamental make-up of these two types is likely

to condition repressions in the one as in the other.

The prophet, aflame with a vision of the "better-than-what-is," protects that vision by an unconscious refusal to make allowance for difficulties and objections. His affective bias favours a repression of historical, scientific and objective considerations. On the other hand, the priest—who is invariably in the majority, and generally also dominant—is obsessed by the fear of what consequences may follow change. He appreciates the groove with all that comfortable absence of responsibility and risk which it implies; he may even have vested interests in the established order, hence he has good grounds for feeling that change is to be avoided. In consequence he represses the *pros* of each proposal as surely as the prophet represses the *cons*. Bagshot says: "Men are too fond of their own life, too angry at the pain of new thought to be able to bear easily with a changing existence."

Furthermore, it is very probable that herd influence contributes an unconscious bias in each type. It is true that the priest is sometimes a rebel and the prophet occasionally

conventional. If this be the case, the individual should carry much weight, because his attitude in religion is against the bias of his psychological make-up. Far more generally the priest is subservient to the voice of the herd and has a profound fear of offending it, while the prophet is predisposed to rebellion, and has an unconscious bias in favour of that which the majority rejects. This will be discussed at greater length in Chapter VIII.

The difference between the attained and the unattained ideal is, perhaps, the most significant difference between the two types. The priest, as we have seen, has many reasons for preferring the attained ideal, whereas the prophet is temperamentally disposed to accept the challenge of the higher standard.

The bias of the priest has a twofold origin—firstly, it is a bias towards the objective, and, secondly, towards the more attainable. The most familiar example of this unconscious motive is afforded by the mother who gives her small son religious instruction regarding the all-good God and the Sinless Saviour, and shortly afterwards says to him : " If I could think you would ever be as good a man as your father, I would be quite content." Certainly

the father is the most objective expression of an ideal available to his son; probably he presents a relatively attainable standard. Two things, however, may be presumed:—

(*a*) That the child, because he *is* a child, is much more influenced by the objective paternal example than by a more shadowy Scriptural pattern, and

(*b*) That the mother, despite her exhortations to her son to "follow the Christ," would resent the suggestion that he ever could be a better man than his father.

Similarly, the traditionalist stocks his calendar with a portentous list of saints. Each may objectify to him some particular virtue, but a critical survey of them would make it clear that for the most part they showed definite limitations in their attempt to follow the divine ideal. This is comforting to the priest mind. Unconsciously it prefers the objectified and limited ideal that a given saint represents to the less objectified and unlimited ideal of the Gospel, and to endue it with that essentially vital quality which he fails to find in the over-objectified patterns of hagiology and in the more attainable ideals of

tradition. Consciously the mother is progressive when she holds up the father to the son as an example. Consciously the clergyman also is progressive when he calls on his flock to venerate King Charles I. as a saint. Unconsciously each of them is regressive, and the prophet is not without excuse in his intolerance. But the priest has no monopoly of unconscious bias. The prophet, as apart from the pure mystic, is almost certainly a propagandist and as such has an unconscious urge to influence men's opinions by force. Consciously his vision is *per se* of such value to society that he is constrained to proclaim it. "Necessity is laid upon" him. But the constraining dynamic may be, in part, at any rate, the unrecognised urge which he shares with the demagogue, the food-reformer, and the anti-vivisectionist. On the other hand, the pure mystic or quietist, who makes little or no effort to influence the opinions of his fellows, may yet have an unconscious motive of considerable importance. To him the contemplative life is consciously the condition of his attaining the closest communion with God. But unconsciously he may be impelled to pursue it by a natural or acquired shrinking

from contact with his fellow-men—a shrinking that may be essentially regressive in his particular case, and one that is parallelled in certain cases of scholars, research workers and devotees of the "simple life."

It must be remembered, however, that tradition as well as vision may be a subject for propaganda. The priest tends to be concerned with standardisation, whereas the prophet's function is essentially a differentiating one. The priest urges sceptics, heretics and indifferentists to come into the true fold, desiring to see men uniformly following the same path. The prophet calls men to separate themselves from the tradition-bound herd and to follow a new way. St. Paul offers an excellent example of a propagandist whose unconscious impulsion worked first in favour of tradition and later in favour of his vision. Much has been written about St. Paul's conversion (Thouless, James, etc.), but insufficient stress has been laid upon that part of St. Paul's psychology which was not changed, namely, his propagandist urge. We talk too easily of the new man and the transformed personality, forgetting that factors of temperamental make-up remain the same, even

if used in a totally different cause. All we can do to influence these factors is to become and remain aware of them. There is good evidence that St. Paul became aware only to a limited extent of his propagandist urge. The blind spot of dogmatic opinion in his psychology remained a blind spot. Thus the early Christian Church was enriched by the service of a pioneer who, behind his great vision and in addition to his rich thought, had an insatiable longing to make others share his opinions. These propagandists have influenced society in all ages. In so far as the subject of their propaganda has been progressive, society has been enriched; in so far as it has been regressive, the community has suffered. Rarely—very rarely—does the world see the phenomenon of the retiring man becoming the prophetic leader by the sheer dynamic of his message apart from the urge of his own temperament. Still more rarely are the forces of convention and tradition led by one who is free from the unconscious bias of propagandism.

CHAPTER V

DOGMA, CREDULITY AND HERESY

Synopsis

The four presentations of religion :

Intellectual.	*Historical.*
	Dogmatic.
Emotional.	*Group loyalty.*
	Personal affect.

Dogma and suggestibility :

The transvaluation from content to source of an idea.
Authority and infallibility : Creeds.

The divergence between rational and affective considerations.

The necessity for recognising ultimate paramountcy of personal affect.

DOGMA, CREDULITY AND HERESY

It is convenient to discuss the presentation of religion under four headings :—

A. Intellectual.	1. Historical.
	2. Dogmatic.
B. Emotional.	3. Group loyalty.
	4. Personal affect.

Out of these four elements can be made up the many shades and tints that characterise religious teaching in all ages and places.

The first factor is the historical. There are many teachers and preachers of Christianity who are wont to lay almost exclusive stress upon it. To them historical validity is a final argument. The element of dynamic emotion, if they consider it at all, is somehow involved in this *de facto* vindication. At the same time they are apt to lack any conception of spiritual evolution, because, in their view, the past contains all the elements necessary for a complete religious system.

The second is the dogmatic presentation. Facts which are undemonstrable are offered for intellectual acceptance. A complete acceptance of these facts is regarded as piety, just as rejection of them is reckoned as heresy.

The third presentation turns on group loyalty. The man whose creed and conduct conform to the demands of his denomination is to consider himself as satisfactorily fulfilling the demands of Christianity. It is not uncommon to hear a man describe himself as "a good Churchman but a rather indifferent Christian." The facile acceptance of a herd adherence, in substitution for a personal and dynamic emotion, is supported, as we shall see in Chapter VIII., by very powerful social impulses.

The fourth factor—the personal affect—is the one which is most essential to progressive religion, and which, at the same time, is least acceptable to the average human being, with his inherent objectivity and his acquired subservience to herd opinion.

It is probable that most preachers would claim to present religion with a judicious admixture of the intellectual and emotional elements, of the historical and dogmatic

factors and of the social and personal appeals. It is competent for the psychologist to discuss the extent to which such a claim is justified, either in expediency or results.

In discussing these four groups, we shall note that there is a constant human tendency to reduce the fourth to the third, the third to the second, and the second to the first. We shall see that pure Christianity is challenging mankind on the point of his direct and personal affective reaction to stimulus. We shall also see that the external pressure of the herd, and the internal resistance to exacting idealism, result in the historical and social elements antagonising, more often than they promote, that desired reaction.

In a previous chapter it was pointed out that the quality of undemonstrability, which belongs to dogma, must vary according to the historical and scientific outlook of the person to whom the dogma is offered. Dogma must, therefore, have a direct relation, not only to factors of education and knowledge, but also to suggestibility. Dogma, as denoting alleged facts that cannot be demonstrated objectively, must be accepted on an inadequate rational basis. The psychologist calls this suggestion.

The clergyman calls it " perception by the eye of faith." This word " faith " has been used in Christian theology with results, in ambiguity and obscurantism, which must be deplored. It is continually employed with alternative or dual connotations, to wit : (*a*) the suggestibility which allows a fact to be intellectually accepted on an inadequate rational basis ; (*b*) the intuitive perception of subjective truth, the process whereby any emotion, vision or ideal can alone become dynamic. These two connotations may co-exist, though more frequently they are separated. No reasonable person can justify the use of so inexact a terminology.

Seeing that dogma is not always accepted with readiness by the devout, religious institutions have an interest in transferring facts from the category of the undemonstrable to that of the demonstrable. Hence organised religion tends to buttress the structure of Christian belief by manipulation of history and even of science, and by passionate resistance to criticism and investigation. This is one of the ways in which ecclesiastical authority deals with dogma. The other way is to maintain suggestibility, and to put a

premium of piety on the conservation in adult years of this puerile characteristic. Similarly, the sin of intellectual arrogance is attributed to those who challenge a dogma in the face of traditional validity and authoritative presentation.

Suggestion is the principal method whereby the adult of the human species transmits to the young the fruits of his accumulated knowledge and experience, though it is in this way that the human infant makes up for the relatively meagre instinctive equipment with which he enters upon life. Gradually individual judgment takes the place of suggested opinion, and the psychologically mature should ideally be free from the influence of authority though, in point of fact, it is doubtful whether this complete emancipation is ever attained. The change consists in a transvaluation from the source to the content of the idea accepted. Thus the child stops beating his drum only when the mother intervenes; the primitive tribesman follows the white explorer into unknown lands and in the face of unexperienced dangers; and the modern woman buys her frock because it is described as the latest Paris fashion. Prestige may be based upon many

considerations ; and in the examples cited, it depended on relationship, racial superiority and social vogue. The child persists in his noisy assault on the peace of the home so long as it is only a stranger that attempts to interfere ; the tribesman follows his native chief only so far as the surroundings are familiar ; the woman refuses to purchase the confection if she knows it was designed in her own town. It is, of course, arguable that prestige may be based upon rational factors of logic and experience. In so far as this is the case, the source of an opinion or decision is part of its intrinsic merit. A man may believe that the Atlantic ocean is two miles deep. This indicates no suggestibility in him, but a very reasonable respect for the observations of those who have sounded the ocean which he has never so much as crossed. There is no affective bias in such a case, and the source of the idea constitutes part of its intrinsic merit. On the other hand, a woman is firmly convinced of her husband's innocence, when the judge and the jury unanimously condemn him. It is obvious that her belief is reached by her emotional bias in favour of the source ; whereas the judge and the jury have presum-

ably dealt with the content of the idea, apart from any such distorting consideration of its source.

It follows from all this that institutionalised religion has much to gain—for the institution—by deflecting the adherent's consideration from the content of a dogma to its source. If this source can be invested with sufficient prestige, and if the adherent can be maintained in his childish attitude of suggestibility, dogma is likely to flourish. For this purpose authority, both religious and ecclesiastical, remains the central feature of current Christianity. The inerrancy of Scripture and the infallibility of the Pope are, from a psychological point of view, merely two examples of the same mechanism. Professor Andrews writes on this point as follows :—

> " It is on the question of authority that the real cleavage exists. A large section of Christendom still finds the ultimate basis of authority in the ecclesiastical tradition of the past. . . . Such a position, however, is confronted by one serious difficulty. It is quite obvious that antiquity is not necessarily a guarantee of truth. The ancient

Church was no more infallible than is the modern. Some form of winnowing fan is therefore required to sift the chaff from the wheat, and the need that soon manifests itself of some principle of selection shows that, left to itself, this theory of authority inevitably breaks down. . . . The chief theological battle is raging round this problem to-day, and upon the settlement of this question depends the interpretation of Christianity in the future." [1]

F. W. Newman wrote with justified assurance: "No proposition that needs to be authoritatively guaranteed ever supplies a spiritual want."

Marcus Dodds says: "The object of the Bible is not to bring us all to a rigid uniformity of belief in all matters, but the far higher object of furnishing all varieties of men with sufficient light to lead them to God." But "the rigid uniformity of belief" is, as we have seen, a fetish of the priest-mind. Indeed the authority given to the Bible seems to be one of the most fruitful sources of spiritual stagnation. A Bible that is protected from reasonable

[1] Chambers's *Encyclopædia*. Vol. III. Art. "Christianity."

historical criticism is one for which infallibility is claimed. The fact of the matter is that the authority of the Bible is buttressed for two main purposes. In the first place, Christians do not believe profoundly enough in Christ or His Cross, and therefore they fear that any encroachment on Biblical authority is a threat to Christianity. But those who try to defend the walls of Jericho in order to protect Calvary will find they are fighting a losing battle. In the second place, Christians have a profound repugnance for symbolical interpretation. This motive is largely unconscious. Men are willing to argue about the zoological possibility of Jonah's sojourn in the whale's belly, because the alternative is too challenging. That alternative is the acceptance of the great symbol of rebirth, a subject which troubled men's minds as far back as the period when the transition took place from object-worship to mythology. This will be dealt with more fully in Chapter XI.

Thus we see how valuable to the religious institution are these two means of promulgating dogma. Let us now consider how group-loyalty is made use of to replace a more direct affective relationship to the Eternal.

Later on we shall see how the herd aims at uniformity, both in conduct and belief. It is clear that in the interests of this uniformity the denomination must be valued above the family, and the family above the individual. Individuation in thought and feeling must necessarily imply a menace to the institution. Hence the corporate presentation of Christianity which devaluates the individual approach. From this requirement also emanates the attempt to direct the individual's affective interests in his personal life to denominational channels, and thereby to promote his subservience to the authority of the denomination. Freedom of judgment should be almost as precious to the mature man as subjective vision. To the average man they are both come by painfully, and through moral effort. Sometimes his religious background has helped him to attain to them. We must admit that more often they are thwarted and diverted to serve the ends of organised religion. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that in all these reactions between authority and independent thought, the motives described above are for the most part unconscious, and that they are

replaced in consciousness by much more reputable motives.

So far we have considered the problem in general. Let us now see how it affects the child and adolescent in their movements towards self-realisation. An intelligent child asked her father, a very broad-minded cleric, if he believed that " Jesus had drowned all those poor pigs," adding that she could never believe Jesus was perfect if He had done anything so cruel. The father replied with great wisdom : " If you feel that way you must certainly not believe the story," and went on to explain that some day she might understand the story as he did, and find it in no way incompatible with a conception of our Lord's perfect nature. There are parents known to the author who, in similar circumstances, would have expressed pained horror at this deplorable lack of faith. There are adults—parents, teachers and preachers—whose attitude to authority has enabled them to accept a large amount of dogma with no apparent effort. How far they are to be congratulated or not is at present immaterial. It is, however, relevant to ask how their attitude affects young people who have

perfectly comprehensible difficulties in this direction. Intentionally or unintentionally they endue credulity with a quality of piety, and by implication those who have difficulty in accepting the undemonstrable are in some wise guilty of perversity. They represent religion as attainable only by intellectual contortions. They interpret " the pure in heart " as the credulously naïve.

It is frequently pointed out in support of the credulity aspect of Christianity that Christ demanded that His followers should " become as little children." But there is an aspect of child nature which is not mere credulity. It consists in a lack of sophistry and cynicism, which are essentially products of maturity. With it are associated a confidence in the trustworthiness of life in the broadest sense of that term. By it new values can be created which are outside the range of those who have lost their vision of the " better-than-what-is." There is a quality of confidence in the capacity for betterment which belongs to most children and a few adults, and which owes nothing to credulity or suggestibility.

A young woman of twenty-five was under treatment for a neurosis. Her mother had

died when she was a young girl ; she had been brought up by an unsympathetic housekeeper and a father whose hopes for this life and the next revolved round the verbal inerrancy of the scriptures. At the age of sixteen she was confirmed, and experienced what she believed to be a sense of spiritual satisfaction and harmony. At twenty she learned for the first time the biological facts of generation. She then realised that the dogma of the Virgin birth was incompatible with biological fact. She concluded that adults in general, and the vicar and her father in particular, had traded upon her innocence. She could not believe that they would have dared ask her to accept such a dogma if she had been in possession of its scientific controversion. As a result she turned from religion, with the feeling that if a central dogma was a lie all the rest might be. She was very unhappy for the five years following. While she was under analytic treatment she heard a sermon by a famous preacher. He spoke of the relative unimportance of intellectual credence, and the primary importance of vital idealism. This seemed to release her as if by magic. The following day she presented herself for treat-

ment, told what had happened, and submitted the following dream:[1] "I was travelling in a third-class railway carriage. The only other passengers were a woman and her little boy, who occupied the corners at the other

[1] The subject of dreams has been largely avoided in this volume for a variety of reasons.

1. Those who have sufficient interest in it may refer to the *New Psychology and the Teacher*.

2. In a book of this size any presentation of so vast a subject as dream interpretation must necessarily be too brief to be convincing. If reviewers may be taken as representing the general reader, it is to be feared that the chapter on dreams in the two previous volumes caused much sorrow and perplexity. Did not Dr. Inge himself pour ridicule (*Evening Standard*, 1923) upon this section of "The New Psychology and the Teacher," following up his comments by recounting a most characteristic dream of his own?

3. The analytical standpoint in psychology does not turn upon dreams and their meanings, although the dream life is in practice found to be the most fruitful source of unconscious material.

4 The dreams quoted in the present volume are from dreamers who are definitely above-par members of the community, and in each case the interpretation was made by the dreamer independent of the analyst.

end of the carriage. As I looked out of the window I admired the lovely view. Then something made me go over to the other side ; I tried to look through the windows, but I could see nothing because they seemed blurred. I was very disappointed. I had the feeling that the woman and the boy wanted me to return to my own seat. At last I did so, and was delighted to find the view even more beautiful than before."

When asked for associations on this dream she could produce none, nor had she any glimpse of an interpretation. It was laid aside. Ten days later she said, " Do you remember that dream of the third-class railway carriage ? Well, I have got the meaning. The mother and boy symbolise the dogma of the Virgin birth. The view I originally enjoyed was my religious outlook before I was twenty. My attempt to look through the other windows was my unavailing effort to see through the dogma of the Virgin birth, after I had realised its incompatibility with scientific fact. The exquisite view I found on returning to my own window symbolises the outlook I have had for the last ten days."

This dream and its interpretation came from

a woman of high intellectual attainments, (she had been head of her school and a scholar of her college), of profound sincerity and mental honesty, and of unusual value to the community at the present time. It serves to show how much spiritual misery can be inflicted upon sensitive souls by the unsympathetic imposition of dogma.

A little reflection makes it clear why this should be. The adolescent is striving to make an adjustment to reality. His instincts are driving him on and his growing idealism is trying to direct them. His reasoning powers are busy with the problems of reality. If he encounters facts which are inextricably bound up with his affective world, his progress is obstructed. His attempt to cope with the world of fact on an adequate rational basis is thwarted by his feeling that disloyalty or impiety is involved in certain beliefs. It matters little whether it be a father who demands the acceptance of a verbally inspired Bible, or a mother who requires submission to an infallible Pope—the results are the same. Fact and reason have to be adjusted to emotional requirements; suggestibility must be maintained or the affective bond broken.

Parents and teachers should realise the incalculable difference which exists between inspiring idealism and exacting credulity. Yet our own views on these matters tend to be so confused that most well-meaning parents have no scruples in "teaching their children to believe" some "fact" that cannot be demonstrably proven, and are proud when the grown-up child says, "I simply believe it because my mother taught it to me."

It is always easier to instruct children in dogma than to infect them with dynamic idealism. The one process implies the cramping of rational and intellectual development; the other should have the contrary effect. This conflict between fact, dogma and idealism can be exemplified by a simple analogy from ordinary life. A man may betroth himself to a maiden because he knows her to be a great heiress, because he thinks her to be so without definite proof, or because he loves her. He may fall in love with her independently of the fact that she is an heiress. He may fall in love with her suspecting that she is the heiress, and ready to continue his courtship whether she is the heiress or not. He may fall in love with her though he has no suspicion

that she is an heiress. The actual heiress corresponds to demonstrable fact. The suspected but unproven heiress is dogma. Love is the affective and subjective element in Christian idealism. Now most professing Christians claim that they are in love with the proven heiress. They may be, but it is not reasonable to demand the same happy conjunction in others. The proven heiress is a fact, and we can demand that the fact shall be admitted by all. But, though we can command intellectual acceptance of demonstrable fact, we cannot demand affective preference. In short, we cannot make anyone love Jesus Christ by proving—however incontrovertibly—that He is the Son of God. Intellectual proof of a fact can generate no affective dynamic. Traditionalists and authoritarians endeavour to bring dogma into the category of proven fact by adducing the evidence of continuous corporate acceptance. "*Quod semper ab omnibus ubique creditum est*" is considered by many a final proof of truth. Granting, solely for the sake of argument, that this is so, there remains the subjective and affective element entirely untouched. When the man's last doubt has been dispelled as to

the lady's patrimony, he may still feel utterly unattracted by her. In short, the reconciliation of intellectual and emotional adjustments cannot be made to order—except on a basis of complete suggestibility. Hence it follows that the psychologist has a right to put this question to the preacher: "When a man finds that the intellectual and affective sides diverge, which is the more important?" The usual answer to this question is the somewhat unsatisfying statement that "they ought to coincide." We have considered on page 117 the case of a clergyman who, in dealing with his daughter's perplexity, had no hesitation in putting first the claim of the affective demand. The Anglican Church, on the other hand, is on the other side. "Whosoever will be saved; before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholick Faith."[1] The psychologist is to be excused if he takes this as meaning that intellectual acceptance and implicit comprehension—of the Athanasian Creed—is a necessary preliminary to salvation. Surely the mere understanding of this archaic document would constitute an effective

[1] The writer is, of course, well aware that this is not the belief of the average Churchman of to-day.

bar to salvation for many good Christains? And if the "Catholick Faith" refers, not to an intellectual process, but to an emotional attitude, there is a striking absence in the subsequent creed of anything resembling dynamic idealism. Many clergymen would, no doubt, defend the pronouncement in question by saying that the word "faith" combines intellectual and affective connotations. In that case we are still without an answer as to which is the more important in the unfortunate—but perhaps common—situation of the man whose reason and emotions do not coincide. The psychologist is perfectly prepared to accept a system which is frankly based on rational grounds—for example, in politics. He is also prepared to admit a primarily emotional basis for conduct, as in marriage. He refuses, however, to countenance any system which is based upon the presumed coincidence and the assumed equality of these two factors.

Before concluding this chapter reference must be made to the mechanism of heresy which occupies such an important place in respect to authority.

The man who is a heretic in his psychological

make-up must be differentiated from the man who is prepared to endorse a particular heresy on its own merits. All true progress in human affairs may, in a sense, be said to have begun in a heresy ; that is to say, that the original sponsor of the idea was willing to dissent from herd opinion in this particular matter. But the confirmed heretic pursues heresy because of a character flaw which impels him to do so. He is a rebel to authority. Therefore he is precisely the same as the conventional and suggestible man, in that his acceptance or rejection of an idea is determined by its source rather than by its intrinsic merits. The fact that an idea emanates from an ostensible authority is sufficient to determine his rejection of it, just as it determines his neighbour's acceptance of it. But, here again, the true motive is never the conscious one. Does his head master advise him to read classics at the University ? He is convinced that his real bent—hitherto unrevealed—is mathematics. Does his father urge him to go into the army ? He is convinced that his future lies in journalism. Does his mother warn him against marrying a woman ten years older than himself ? He

applies for a special licence next day. In short, the rebel against authority is no more capable of unbiassed thinking than is the completely suggestible man, and the proof of this statement may be found in the fact that it is equally easy to predict of each one of them what view he will take on any given subject.

Benjamin Kidd, assuming an antithesis between reason and religion, wrote: "The central feature of human history is not reason but religion, which has kept progress going when reason would have ended it. Religion is the real cement of society."

This quotation reminds us of the one widespread cause of failure in the treatment of religion. It is the common tendency of man to endeavour to reduce life to uniform terms. Reason, expediency, social cohesion, history, and many other aspects of life are used as categories into which the whole of religion may be compressed. But just as science must recognise that metaphysics is outside its sphere, so the religious traditionalist, the champion of a "reasonable religion" and others must recognise that the core of Christianity is in another category. Professor Arthur Thomson, in a Gifford

Lecture recently published, referred to the mechanical and chemical categories as being not so much untrue as irrelevant. New categories are needed. Our values should begin with the progressive, as opposed to the regressive, response to challenge. The desire to rule life by logic must come after and not before it. Yet this will never conflict with the supreme value of truth—only with logic. And it is to his faulty logic, with its egocentric and evasive rationalisations, that man clings with all the support he can derive from his social environment. Hence it is very necessary that, by the prestige of authority, the logic of the coward should be made to appear to be the logic of the hero.

CHAPTER VI

AUTHORITY AND THE MOTHER-COMPLEX: THE "PETER PAN" MOTIF

Synopsis

Analogy of human relationships in Christianity.

Consideration of normal emotional development of the child and adolescent : rotation of phases in the boy and girl.

The " Peter Pan " motif.

Characteristics of the Mother-and Father-complex types of religion.

Analogy between the emotional development of the individual and the spiritual evolution of the race.

AUTHORITY AND THE MOTHER-COMPLEX: THE PETER PAN MOTIF

CHRISTIANITY, perhaps more than any other religion, has made use of human relationships as patterns or analogies for the relation between God and the human being. Mystics before and after Santa Teresa have approached the divine from the angle of love and marriage. This subject will be more fully dealt with in Chapter X. Both the Old and New Testaments refer continually to the Fatherhood of God. In the New Testament Christ is held up as the brother of man. The Roman and Greek Churches have from early days of their history insisted on the relation of the believer as child to Mary the mother of Jesus. In the present chapter it is proposed to discuss the mother and father relationships, and in order to understand their bearing on religion it will be necessary to consider at some length the usual emotional development of the child and adolescent.

Boy and girl alike are purely egocentric when

they begin life. Their interest is exclusively fixed on the satisfaction of their own bodily desires. Very soon the infant learns to associate the mother with ideas of nourishment, comfort, protection and consolation. Gradually the infant's attachment to his mother becomes the centre of his emotional life. This attachment stands for the great characteristics of childhood.

1. It is fundamentally selfish, although it may appear otherwise.
2. It implies dependence to a greater extent than any other human relationship.
3. It is incompatible with responsibility; and perhaps there is no more crucial test of emergence from the mother phase, than that of readiness to accept responsibility.
4. It implies that the child seeks, rather than offers, protection.
5. It is, to a great extent, asssociated with suggestibility which precludes individual thinking.
6. In that it is selfish, it involves an individual aim rather than a merging of the individual's aim in that of the social group.

This phase of mother attachment should, by a process of attenuation, give place to the second phase, somewhere about the ages of

six and nine. With the boy the second phase is one of attachment to the father, and this is primarily characterised by aspirations after independence and a readiness to contemplate responsibility. The attitude of seeking or counting upon protection wanes, and chivalry begins to manifest itself in early offers of protection to younger or weaker children. Normally, the attitude to the father should be one of emulation, and this should be the beginning of the boy's power psychology. Self-assertion has hitherto been expressed mainly for the attainment of specific wants. Now it finds expression for its own sake. The primary desire for security and comfort gives way to an aspiration to do things "like daddy." It is at this stage that the danger of authority is greatest. The boy is at this point more of a nuisance to society than he is likely to be again. If paternal authority be constantly evoked to ensure less anti-social conduct, the boy tends to regard authority (as vested in the father) in the light of an insurmountable barrier to achievement. Maurice Nicoll[1] says: "People who have an infantile

[1] "Some Analytical Interpretations." *Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology.* May, 1921.

psychology do not accept life *as it lies potentially in them.* . . . The thing that they will not submit to . . . becomes the father. For a man, the father is biologically the opponent, as long as the man has not developed his own strength, his own father in himself. . . . The finding of the authority in oneself makes the approach to life quite new."

It will thus be seen that if the boy fails to respond to the example of the father in a normal way—*i.e.*, by aspiring to emulate him, he finds himself obstructed in his emotional development because he refuses "to accept life as it lies potentially in him." In such a case the usual result is equivalent to that which ensues when boys are brought up without a father or father-substitute available at the critical age. This result is regression which consists in replacing a recent adaptation by a previous one. In other words, the boy returns to the mother phase. The term "mother-complex" is conveniently used in analytical psychology to denote an emotional orientation (which corresponds to the first phase of development).

In the third phase of the boy's development his dominant emotional interest is with other

boys—firstly, the heroes of his school environment, who partake to some extent of the nature of father-substitutes, and from whom he may derive an incentive to develop and progress. Then boys of his own age, and finally smaller boys, to whom he shows his power either by maltreating them or by threatening to maltreat those who would do them an injury. In this phase it is normal for the boy to express a marked detachment from the other sex. This phase may be expected to last from fourteen to eighteen, though it is to be remembered that these figures are subject to very notable variations.

At about eighteen the boy should enter upon the final or mating phase—the phase in which normal romance and passion should lead to courtship, marriage and parenthood. If we consider these four phases, we note that the boy's attitude to his mother is reversed in almost every detail in the man's attitude to his mate. Instead of being selfish it is unselfish. Instead of dependence there is independence. Responsibility is undertaken and not evaded. Protection is given, not sought. The man tends to inspire the views of his wife rather than the reverse. The aim of the

man's life should be social, and is necessarily so in so far as he commits himself to supporting a wife and family. These two phases, with their notable contrasts, are the two hetero-sexual phases of the boy's development. They are separated by the two homosexual phases, father and schoolfellows. It becomes obvious why these homosexual phases fulfil such a necessary function in the boy's development. They allow of a complete reversal of the attitude towards women. The failure of these phases, for whatever cause, leads to mal-development that is likely to be permanent. The man who has not been a normal schoolboy is not likely to be a normal husband. The boy who has been reared as the apple of his mother's eye is likely to demand the same central position in his wife's view of the world. The father who has not experienced paternal inspiration is unlikely to exercise any on his son. The boy who does not cast off his moorings from the maternal haven when the tide calls, will have difficulty in reaching the open sea and fullness of life when he makes a belated attempt.

If we turn to the girl's emotional develop-ment we find that somewhat later than the boy

—say at about nine—her dominant emotional interest should cease to be in her mother, but instead of turning to her father as the boy does, she finds her schoolfellow phase early, and only later, perhaps at about fifteen, she fixes her emotions on her father. Her relation to him is totally different from that of the boy, and in order to understand it we must realise certain elementary facts about development. Parenthood is the biological goal of evolution in the individual. As paternity is the biological destiny of the boy, so motherhood is the biological destiny of the girl. The failure to achieve fatherhood and the failure to attain to motherhood constitute evidence of biological incompleteness. Civilised society may prate as it pleases about the glorious emancipation of refined people from the bonds of their animal natures, but the fact remains that from the tenderest years to past middle life we are haunted by our biological destiny.[1]

1 The sophistries about an intermediate sex ignore three obvious facts of biology :—

(*a*) Every human being produces ova or spermatozoa, and none, so far as the writer is aware, produces both.

(*b*) Fatherhood can only be achieved by an act of power, that might be described as an aggression.

(*c*) Motherhood can only be attained by an act of surrender.

Now the boy's self-assertion, already referred to, is the early manifestation of a power urge which is biologically destined to fit man for procreation. The girl, on her part, expresses at an early age her maternal aspirations by playing with dolls, and later on by her intense interest in babies. This aspiration is associated with whatever childish theory she may have invented or believed, as that babies were brought by the doctor in his bag. Sooner or later she accepts the idea of a husband as a social necessity. But later on, often at about the age of puberty, she realises that the husband in some incomprehensible way is a biological prerequisite to motherhood. It begins to dawn on her that if she is to satisfy her maternal phantasy she will be required to put herself physically in the power of a man. It is at this point that she should normally turn to her father. If his treatment of her mother has been what it should have been, she will reassure herself by the reflection that she would trust herself to a man such as her father with perfect confidence. The father then acts to his daughter as the reconciler of maternal aspirations and vague fears of mating. By this reconciliation she should reach, at about

seventeen or eighteen, the fourth phase that should lead to love, marriage and motherhood.

It is to be noted here that the homosexual phases in the girl's development are the first two, and that she reaches a heterosexual orientation sooner than the boy in that the last homosexual phase ends about fifteen. This accounts in some measure for the recognised fact that a girl of twenty is much more mature than a youth of the same age. It also accounts for the fact that a parental fixation in a girl is a lesser regression than the same failure in a boy. In order to make clear this statement, some explanation is called for. The Freudian school has always made a central point in its psychology of the so-called incest-wish of the child. The feeling of the boy towards the mother is referred to as the Oedipus complex, and the attachment of the girl to her father as the Electra complex. How far there is justification for regarding these attachments as incest-wishes need not be here discussed. Let it suffice to say that, promulgated as psychological generalisations, they are extremely crude and probably not scientific. What does interest us, however, is to realise that the fixation of emotion on

the parent of the opposite sex involves with the boy a regression to Phase I., whereas with the girl it only implies a regression to Phase III. While development may stop at the father phase for the boy, so also the girl may regress to the mother phase; but these regressions are less common.

If the reader has followed this brief sketch of emotional development, he should be able to appreciate the profound significance of the teaching contained in Barrie's immortal play of *Peter Pan*. To many this is but a charming and amusing fairy-play for children. But "those who see" may well "take off their shoes."

The play is taken up with the great theme of the child's escape from reality into phantasy. Peter Pan's original retreat from reality was occasioned by his hearing his parents discussing, on the day of his birth, what he should be when he grew up. The writer is reminded of a small boy who being otherwise apparently normal, signalised his first term at a good preparatory school by running away—generally, but not always, home—several times a week. When he was asked, not why he ran away, but what he was going to be, he replied :

"A solicitor, I suppose." On further questioning, it turned out that the father was a solicitor, that the elder brother stoutly maintained he was going into the Navy, and the family had explained to our Peter Pan that he would therefore require to be a solicitor to carry on the family business. His real ambition was to be an engineer. How many Peter Pans are created by this premature presentation of an unwelcome destiny! Life is at best a menacing affair to any small child, and most adults lack memory or imagination or both to temper the wind of reality and responsibility to the sensitive mind of the child. The Never-Never Land is a place full of colour and glamour, adventure and romance. But it always produces a giant for Jack to kill, a Goliath for David to slay, or a Captain Hook for Peter Pan to discomfit. The boy whose life is sterile in adventure and achievement will compensate for these in phantasy; and not infrequently his exploits in phantasy will satisfy him, and leave no power for the conquest of reality.

Flying is the stock symbol for movements in phantasy. From Icarus to the youngest child that dreams to-day of an aeroplane

the meaning is the same; it is always the miraculous solution by leaving objective reality. Our language bears witness to the universality of the symbol—"a flight of fancy"—"in the clouds"—"coming down to earth," and so on.

Barrie—or should we say M'Connachie?—says: "The reason birds can fly and we can't is simply that they have perfect faith, for to have faith is to have wings." Any reference to the word faith should arrest the attention of the preacher. Faith. . . . Wings: we seem to have heard this before. "Mount up with wings as eagles"—"Oh, for the wings of a dove." But Peter Pan used his faith to fly to the land of phantasy, away from the challenge of life. This subject is of such importance that a digression seems to be justified.

Phantasy may be of three categories:—

(*a*) Creative.
(*b*) Inspiratory.
(*c*) Compensatory.

Creative phantasy is, in Jung's phrase, "the mother of possibilities." All movement in Art, Literature, and invention originates in creative

phantasy. Inspiratory fantasy describes the schoolboy's dream that he will win his colours, and the statesman's vision of becoming Prime Minister. The test of this type of phantasy is pragmatic ; if the dream is one which, in the nature of the case is unattainable, it is not inspiratory, but belongs to the third class—namely, compensatory phantasy. If the dark-haired little boy in the log cabin dreams that some day he will be in White House, there is nothing in the nature of things to make his phantasy anything more than remote, and it may stimulate him to valuable effort for many a year. But if he dreams that he will wake up next morning with blue eyes and fair hair, it is clearly a phantasy compensating for physical features from which he desires to escape. The question for the preacher is therefore this : What is the quality of phantasy associated with his conception of religion ? If faith gives wings, where does he fly to ? And, nearly as important—whither does he direct others to fly ? Towards life with its unlimited challenge, or to the land where a serious challenge never materialises ? Is it to a Cross that has to be taken up, or to a life of peaceful security and permanent irrespon-

sibility? The psychologist may perhaps be pardoned for observing that when adults solemnly sing "Safe in the arms of Jesus," they present a very obvious parallel to Peter Pan enlarging on the attractions of the Never-Never Land. In short, these are "nursery reactions"; we can either drag our religion down to the nursery level, or we can grow up to its true level.

But to return to the play itself. The cave dwelling which is such a prominent feature of Peter Pan's retreat, is underground. It is a symbol of security and of introversion. The child who is living a life of compensatory phantasy feels this sense of the inner-ness of his life, the security from exposure, the absence of contact with reality. It is the Nirvana of protected and effortless passivity to which further reference will presently be made. Tinkabel is the unseen fairy that gives advice; she is the inner light of intuition that is so shy of functioning in public. One of the great problems of living is to maintain an active function of intuition along with a full adaptation to reality.

There is much more in Peter Pan that has symbolical interest, but the point that is for our

purpose supremely relevant is his relationship to Wendy. It will be remembered that when she reached the Never-Never Land she was immediately constituted mother, because all the boys in the Never-Never Land have mothers. In other words, every boy who lives a life of compensatory phantasy has a mother-concept as the central feature of his phantasy. But not so Wendy. The principal phantasy of the girl is one of motherhood, and as such it is a progressive as opposed to a regressive one. Hence, when Wendy and Peter return from the Never-Never Land, and Wendy implores Peter to remain with her, he refuses. In reality, she can no longer be his mother, but wishes to be his mate. Her sojourn in phantasy has prepared her for her maternal destiny in reality; whereas his experience has unfitted him for assuming the responsibility of mating, and he returns to his life of phantasy where, no doubt, he will provide himself with another mother-substitute. This is the great climax in the play of the phantasy life. In actual experience we find the same. The man with a mother complex reaches his dramatic *impasse* when he faces or is faced with marriage.

We are now in a position to take a general view of man's emotional development. We see the starting point and the goal, and we recognise the two great mental mechanisms involved.

The starting point is birth, and symbolically it is the ante-natal state which is used to represent the Nirvana condition. Jung describes this as the universal Mother Paradisal Unconscious : the state from which our personal differentiation begins ; the state of unlimited security and effortless irresponsibility. The goal is psychological maturity and biological parenthood, with all the independence, acceptance of responsibility, and facing of reality that the terms imply, and with such differences as are demanded by the divergent destinies of the man and of the woman. In between these two we have the four phases of development, with all the possibilities they offer of progression and regression. We have the child's suggestibility and his normal tendency to replace suggestion by individual judgment ; we have the clash of the boy's aspiration with the authority of the father ; we have the challenge to the boy to " accept life as it lies potentially " in him ; we have his

possible evasion in regarding himself as under authority ; we have his reluctance to face the uncongenial, and his possible escape into compensatory phantasy. Always we see that the movement forward towards maturity demands favourable environment or great spiritual effort. Failing these there is certain to be a regressive movement ; back to the mother, back to irresponsibility, back to suggestible acceptance of authority, back to the congenial in phantasy, back to the earliest step in adaptation to reality.

It follows from all this that the emotional relationships of the child may be of any quality from the most progressive to the most regressive ; and each quality of the human relationship can be exactly duplicated in the relationship of the individual to his God.

The man to whom God is primarily a Divine Mother manifests the following characteristics in his religious orientation :—

1. His religion primarily serves a selfish end, despite any proclaimed element of altruism.

2. The man whose relation to the Eternal is that of son to mother tends to be dependent. This generally shows itself in his desire to live where there is a church

of his sect, to be among avowed co-religionists, and so on. He knows that his religious impulse needs constant stimulation of a suggestive nature. He recognises that if it be left to nourish itself it will be likely to come to an end.

3. The evasion of ethical responsibility is an essential characteristic of a religious orientation based upon the mother pattern. Hence authority is sought at every turn, and the individual shrinks from acting on his own experience or intuition. A decision is made because "the Bible says it is wrong," or because "the Church allows it," or because "my director forbids me." This attitude which is welcome in the nursery is unsuitable in later years, and religions which tend to cultivate the "Mother Church" principle tend to foster in their adult adherents an atrophy of that greatest of human faculties —the direct and personal recognition of that which is ethically progressive, of the call to a heroic reaction, in short, of God's will. It is among such that dogma flourishes.

A young lady whose religion was of the mother type expressed great concern because her confessor had forbidden her to dance during Lent. A few days later she appeared at a ball. When asked how she was going to appease the confessor, she naïvely replied, "Oh, it's all right; I've changed my confessor."

4. A religion which is cast in the mother mould implies the seeking of protection rather than the giving of it. It has been pointed out frequently in this volume that the quest of security in this life or the next as a primary

feature of any man's religious outlook, is an obvious negation of the altruistic principle of Christianity.

Perhaps no spectacle in the war was more tragic than that of the pious mother who, after her son had been killed, announced that her "faith had been destroyed." God had been fervently, confidently and constantly implored to save the woman from this intense suffering. He had not heard. Therefore there was not a God—or if there was He was a cruel God, and not a God of love. But the God of Gethsemane passing the bitter cup does not enter into the religious scheme of those whose God is worshipped and conciliated as the protector from pain and evil.

5. The mother-complex type of religion depends on suggestion as opposed to independent thinking, rational or contemplative. From this three groups of characteristics emanate.

(*a*) Auto-suggestive phenomena occur, as, for instance, visions, voices and other hallucinatory forms.

(*b*) The miraculous flourishes; physical healings, miraculous escapes, divine interventions of every kind.

(*c*) Revivals take place which are based upon mob-suggestibility.

This question of suggestibility is one that affects the whole of life, for in all communities there are many nominal adults who are only capable of making a satis-

factory adjustment to life on a basis of suggestion. With many it is due to educational factors. When Loyola said, "Give me the first five years of a child's life, and I care not who has the rest," he uttered a very profound educational truth. During these first five years we can actually and literally mould the child and can insure that he shall be almost anything we determine, except the personality God intended him to be. It is possible, during the mother-phase, to implant ideas, prejudices, hopes, and particularly fears, that will permanently preclude self-realisation later on. We can insure an orientation towards authority, which will never yield to the tender growth of independent judgment. All children brought up on such authoritarian lines become rebels, or else—as is far more common—remain ultra-suggestible throughout life. But there are also those who, from inherent mental weakness, defy even the best educational help and remain permanently suggestible. All these must have a friendly solicitor, a fatherly doctor, and an authoritative priest. They easily respond to mob suggestion, and a revival meeting may well fulfil an ethically useful function for them. But those who should have reached their own individual standpoint and for lack of effort have failed to do so, stand in another class. They are accepting in a revival conversion a second-rate form of religion, because it is based on mediate rather than immediate experience, and because it has been accepted, not when they were at their own high-water mark, but below it—*i.e.*, when they were more suggestible, and, therefore, more childish than normally.

6. The man whose religion belongs to his mother-phase is likely to show a subtle selfishness in regard to the rest of society. He may be an active propagandist, he may be a generous giver, he may be closely identified with his sect, but he rarely, if ever, shows a broad human sympathy.

A remarkably intelligent man of this sort once remarked: "I can't understand why people worry so much about their neighbours' affairs. Of course if a member of my church behaves badly I regret it, but no sin outside it interests me. I simply say to myself, 'If they are not striving to obey God's will as revealed by the (he meant "my") church, what *does* it matter?'" Now here is the complete devaluation of progress and spiritual growth by contrast with the acceptance of a certain authoritarian code. This is strangely characteristic of the spoiled child in religion, and, as it seems to the psychologist, an explicable perversion of the spirit of Christianity.

In all these six directions, then, we see the debasing effect of psychological puerility on the essential principle of Christianity. Summed up in two words the characteristics of this type of religion are safety and ease. Dr. Inge has described this regressive religious attitude as follows:—"It all comes of following the line of least resistance. It is so much easier to swallow a dogma than to model our lives on a very arduous pattern. It is so

much less trouble to appropriate the merits of Christ by eating His flesh, with the Catholic, or by "resting on His finished work," like the Protestant, than to take up the cross to follow Him. The sale of indulgence is a notorious example of these attempts to take a short and easy cut to heaven; but the Lutheran doctrine of faith was itself an indulgence of a different kind. That is the way in which religions are constantly corrupted. It does not matter much what form the corruption takes. The essence of it is that it appears to save us trouble."

If we turn now to the father-phase of development we see it associated with a totally different form of religion. Here it is not the easy way nor yet the safe road, but the path to power that attracts. The struggles of early puberty in which the boy tries alternately to resist paternal authority and to identify himself with it, are clearly recognisable. The Puritans, the Covenanters and the Lutherans may be taken as examples. God was to them primarily a source of power expressed either in their resistance to persecution or in their religious tyranny. Theirs was a God of battle—a draconic God—essentially virile; and, perhaps

more than any other type of Christianity, this of the Church Militant lent itself to tribal purposes. It is a notable fact that when the war broke out, it was the robust Lutheran God that was so used, and not the Mother-God of the Bavarian Roman Catholics. In all time there will be men with a power psychology who will set up their Jehovah-*nissi*, complacently satisfied that under such a banner they may express their power-urge with the fullest ethical justification.

The phase of development in which I have pointed out that schoolfellows constitute the dominant emotional interest is the one which includes the best type of Christianity. That in which guidance, inspiration and fellowship are all mingled, and in which the adolescent has completely outgrown his dependence on maternal protection. At the same time he has, at least partially, solved his problem of paternal authority. This corresponds to the Brother presentation of Jesus Christ.

In biology the individual is regarded as passing through an epitomised history of its species during its embryonic development. It seems not altogether unreasonable to suppose that there is a similar analogy between

the emotional development of the human being and the spiritual evolution of the human race. Were this conceded it would appear that the Christian religion represents the third phase of development—that phase which stands between the parental and the conjugal, the phase which blends communion with partial independence. If so, it might be legitimate to surmise that, between the present revelation of the Cross and man's ultimate attainment to divine perfection, there stands a new and most critical phase, that in which communion becomes essentially creative, that in which the divine spirit continually begets in the human soul new spiritual values.

CHAPTER VII

CONFLICT, COMPENSATION AND PROJECTION: THE "DEAR BRUTUS" MOTIF

Synopsis

Successive forms of conflict.

The effects of conflict and the unconscious mechanisms of transference, compensation and projection.

These mechanisms in relation to (*a*) the challenge of the religious life ; (*b*) our reaction to it.

The " Dear Brutus " *motif :* Projection and rationalisation, with the lesson that nobility never matures in phantasy, if it does not flourish in reality.

The conception of adequacy to the demands of life.

The sense of inferiority and its reactions : compensatory self-assertion : choice of a protective form of religion.

The study of psychological types in relation to religion. Permanent reunion can only be based upon an ungrudging appreciation of the diversity of these types and of the consequent need for varied forms of religious expression.

CONFLICT, COMPENSATION AND PROJECTION: THE "DEAR BRUTUS" MOTIF

WHEN man began his conflict it was based upon the instinct of self-preservation which collided with the menacing factors in his environment. Then came the social era when he recognised that social claims conflicted with his own passions and desires. Then came the recognition that progress was not limited by, nor necessarily synonymous with, social claims and social tradition; and that beyond the obvious antagonism of ego and herd demands there often was, and always should be, a higher dilemma —that between regression and progress, between a childish reaction and a mature reaction, between the coward and the hero in himself.

During the war there were hundreds of examples of men groping among these conflicting claims. There were men who went voluntarily into the trenches from sheer

cowardice, because they shrank from social disparagement more than from death and wounds. There were heroes who became conscientious objectors though they suffered social tortures compared to which physical death would have been a relief. There were heroes among the " Cuthberts," and cowards among the decorated. But most of these were profoundly ignorant of the exact nature of their conflict. Few of them were able to assess the relative power of instinctive, social and intuitive factors. The average man accepted society's decision as being the call of duty—and he was generally right, because it tended to coincide with the progressive reaction for himself. Most of us came across a sufficient number of the perplexed to realise, not only how profound was the man's ignorance of his true motives, but also how numerous were the rationalisations whereby the call of society, or of the inner light, or of both, was made to conform to instinctive demands.

But the feature of such a situation that is of paramount interest is the resultant distortion of behaviour. When a complex is repressed, the particular emotion associated with it is denied direct expression, but in-

variably finds its way out indirectly. This is the mechanism known to psychologists as " the transference of the affect."

The man who stayed at home and persuaded himself, by rationalising, that it was his duty to do so, repressed certain arguments for serving, and by that act he created a complex which was certain to be permeated by an affect of shame. This shame would transfer itself to other reactions for no apparent reason. Thus he might become unduly sensitive about his clothes or his appearance, about his credit with the tradesmen, about his reputation in his club, his office or his church. It is certain that he would not be aware of the reason for this new sensitiveness, but actually it would be due to the transferred shame affect. In other cases it would lead to compensation, and the man would be impelled to explain gratuitously, emphatically and lengthily, the excellent reasons which had reluctantly precluded him from active service. Or else he might react to his complex by a mechanism of projection, which generally took the form of actively taking part in recruiting propaganda. The human mind remains to this day peculiarly susceptible to the value of vicarious

righteousness. In other cases—those with a neuropathic tendency—the repression might give birth to an expiatory myth, and the man might be impelled, apart from any conscious justification, to acts which symbolised his remorse or sense of guilt, such as hand-washing, over-determined asceticism, exaggerated generosity, morbid sympathy for the wounded, etc. Yet again, he might, in consequence of his conflict, project his disgust for his own cowardice on to others, and speak or act violently and unjustly about others who appeared to be evading duty.

All these mechanisms are active in daily life, and therefore in the religious life. They may be considered from the two angles of (*a*) the character of the challenge ; (*b*) the character of our reaction.

In our treatment of the challenge we are perpetually repressing. We rationalise Christ's demand until it has been reduced to terms in which we are prepared to meet it. In this we are generally assisted by institutional religion. We know that fanaticism often does more harm than good, and we cling, with the aid of our religious leaders, to this congenial truth, bringing into the category of

fanaticism any religious reaction which is not thoroughly conventional in our particular *milieu*. This kind of repression is as certain as any other repression to produce its unconscious reaction in life and conduct: we sneer at the fanatics with a peculiar venom; we praise the reactionaries with a warmth that owes its origin to our identifying ourselves with them, and so on.

When it comes to the character of our own reaction to the religious challenge, we find ourselves always ready with an ingenious rationalisation whereby it is shewn that, whatever the demand may be, we are doing our best under trying circumstances to meet it; whereas if we had leisure, health, wealth, position, education or what not, how fully would we respond to the claim of religion!

Barrie, in *Dear Brutus*, has elaborated this theme with astonishing and searching brilliance.

> 'The fault, Dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
> But in ourselves that we are underlings.'

The story of the play, familiar to most readers no doubt, is worth recalling. A benevolent, aged and mischievous elf, a sort of

senile Puck, invites to his house a party of strangers on the eve of midsummer. It is revealed to them that they are all there because they consider that they could have done better if they had had a better chance in life. The magic wood offers to all but one of them this chance.

Will Dearth is the charming artist who has failed in life and failed in his profession. He has failed to satisfy his wife, Alice, whose contempt for him is profound. He has taken to drink and his conviction is that, if he had had a child, all would have been different; that he would have been a successful artist instead of a "might-have-been"; that he would have been a happy husband instead of a despised and miserable one. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, with the exception of the alcoholic touch, this is a brilliant piece of self-revelation on the author's part. In the magic wood Will, instead of being married and childless, is the widower father; instead of being despised by his wife he is adored by his daughter; he is at work again and is "an uncommonly happy nobody." But it is transient. The joys of parenthood are not, or should not be, permanent. They

demand of us growth and progressive adjustment to the developing child. In *Mary Rose* Barrie has given us the unforgettable picture of the young mother who could not make the progressive adjustment to her child, and when he was twenty-six was still a restless ghost seeking fruitlessly her year-old babe. So Will Dearth has asked of life a condition that he cannot hold down ; it is kinetic and demands progress if he is to keep up with it. He describes to Margaret an incident that occurred when she was small ; how he carried her on his shoulders into the stream when he was fishing. This is very rich symbolism of almost universal application. The natural tendency of parents is to stand between their children and the inexorable flight of time. We try to carry them so that they shall not be swept along, knowing in our heart of hearts that once it carries them on towards maturity we shall have to keep up or lose them. The talk between Will Dearth and Margaret reveals the father's ill-feigned preoccupation lest marriage should rob him of his child. And at the end of the act he loses her. The man who cannot make a successful conjugal adjustment in life need not cheat himself into

the belief that he could have made an adequate parental adjustment, for it is the latter rather than the former that is more exacting if it is to be enduring.

Alice Dearth, who has been an artist's model, bemoans her unwisdom in marrying this futile and now contemptible husband. How different would her life have been had she married the Hon. Finch-Fallowe, that virile, though gay, man of the world. In the magic wood we see her a wild, ill-conditioned creature who has had her wish and been thrown aside by Finch-Fallowe, the libertine. Alice's lesson is that material and instinctive values must ultimately be secondary to cultural and spiritual values, in the promotion of happiness.

Mr. Coade is a middle-aged gentleman of irresistible charm. He is the university man of means, who has never done more than collect the material for his monumental work on the feudal system. He is convinced that, had he not "been cursed with a competency," he would have made his mark and been a useful member of society instead of "just a nice lazy man." In the magic wood we see Mr. Coade as a delightful and inconsequent creature,

playing on a penny whistle and dancing in a way that may be charming but can hardly be regarded as useful. He returns in the third act and admits that when he was in the wood and deprived of his financial support he " never wrote a line." His lesson is too obvious to need formulation.

Mrs. Coade is unique in the play. She is the only perfectly adjusted person. Hence she has no call to the magic wood—she remains unchanged—perfectly content throughout. It is characteristic of Barrie's insight into emotional mechanisms that he should choose, as the exacting situation, for this adjusted woman, that of the childless second wife. Furthermore, Coade's absent-mindedness contributed to the piquancy of the situation. He perpetually offered his wife a footstool for no better reason than that his first wife, being lame, always required one. Also it fell to Mrs. Coade to keep the photograph of the first wife and the lock of hair on her husband's dressing-table—when left to himself he would have ignored them. The whole picture of a perfect adjustment to a difficult emotional situation is in brilliant contrast to the remainder of the unadjusted characters.

John Purdie is the philanderer; he is a vain young barrister with a supreme ego-phantasy. In the first act he is caught by his wife, Mabel, making love to Joanna. He expresses his self-love and self-pity by representing himself as the man who has always lacked spiritual sympathy in his married life. He protests his unswerving devotion to Joanna. He describes what he would be capable of, with such a mate as she would make. In the magic wood he is married to Joanna, and finds himself making the identical protestations of devotion to Mabel. And in the third act he is forced to acknowledge that his inconstancy results not from his wife, but from his inherent weakness—the weakness of the rationalising sentimentalist trying to fulfil his heroic phantasy.

Mabel herself, who has tried to make the best of her husband's emotional excursions, finds herself in the wood playing the "*tertium quid*," with that zest which she condemned so uncompromisingly in Joanna.

Joanna, in the first act, rationalises her conduct on the theory that her response to John Purdie's approaches enables him to fulfil the better his difficult task of adjusting to

the unsympathetic Mabel. But in the magic wood she obviously fails to appreciate the weight of the identical arguments when used by Mabel. Her lesson is that we have no right to demand of others adjustments that we do not know ourselves to be capable of making.

Lady Caroline is the arrogant, independent snob whose denunciation of Matey, the thieving butler, has been in the first act the most severe. In the magic wood she finds herself married to this uneducated rascal. She finds herself subservient to him, applauding him even in his rascalities. Her lesson is the unwisdom of flaunting social and ethical standards before we have found ourselves able to support them in the face of instinctive temptation.

Matey is confident that he would have been an honest member of society had he gone into business, as he might have done, and thus avoided the temptations of domestic service. In the magic wood he is a successful boot-merchant who openly boasts that he has amassed a fortune by unscrupulous methods. Morality rarely depends on environment, though many have wished to believe it.

And so Barrie teaches us, of his incomparable psychological vision, the old lesson that nobility never matures in phantasy if it does not flourish in reality ; that man is not made by his environment but by his idealism ; that our failures are due to our failings and not to our circumstances. This play has been dealt with at some length, not solely because it is pertinent, but also in the hope that preachers may be more ready than they have hitherto been to pursue, to catch and to transmit the inner symbolical significance of all good drama and fiction.

It was pointed out, earlier in this chapter, that man rationalises in regard to the nature of the demand and the nature of his reaction to the demand. This conception leads us on to the idea of adequacy. Every man is aware —however remotely—of the degree of adequacy he possesses for a given task. The sense of inadequacy is liable to lead to feelings of inferiority, and the most usual result of such a sense of inferiority is a compensatory assumption of superiority. It is universally acknowledged that the small man tends to be aggressively self-assertive. Those who have had anything to do with the high-grade de-

fective are accustomed to his boastfulness, his dogmatism, his self-satisfaction. The physically feeble are haunted throughout life, and not merely in their schooldays, by a sense of their limitations, which is out of all proportion to the likelihood of their being called upon to defend their lives by muscular strength. But perhaps the profoundest effects of an inferiority sense are to be noted in the sphere of sex. Many members of both sexes whose physical development is otherwise average are sexually inadequate in a physiological sense. They are frequently unaware of the true nature of this inadequacy, and yet their whole psychological make-up betokens inferiority, either by direct expression or in compensatory reactions. It is necessarily difficult for the individual with a sense of inferiority to attain to true self-harmony, and this difficulty reveals itself very frequently in his religious reactions. He is likely to develop a mother-type of religion, and to magnify the protective element in the divine, or he will compensate by a noisy heresy of some kind.

A wealthy man championed, as his fathers had done before him, the cause of evangelical religion. His son was a poor weakling of

considerable intellectual ability but devoid of self-confidence in any shape or form. At school he was known as "the worm," and at college his nickname was "Rabbit." His parents made no effort to conceal from him their disappointment in his obvious incapacity to do justice to his opportunities. He reached the age of twenty-one obsessed by a sense of inferiority from within and without. Then the worm turned, and he adopted an authoritarian religion. By so doing he satisfied three distinct demands :—

1. He compensated for his inferiority, felt and alleged, by an act that demanded real courage.

2. He expressed his resentment for parental disparagement in the way most certain to hurt.

3. He replaced the more robust and individual type of religion by one in which the mother-aspect was stressed.

It would be well that religious proselytisers should recognise as fully as possible the inner factors conditioning a "conversion."

But the man with an inferiority sense is but one of many psychological types whose characteristics have a bearing on their religion. It is clear that widely divergent types cannot

possibly find satisfaction in the same form of worship. Much of the talk about ecclesiastical reunion seems to centre on the conception that one form of Church service can be devised which shall be the best for everybody. This is to ignore the patent truth that different types must seek communion with the Eternal in varying ways if that quest is to be in any sense adequate. In fact one could go further and say that, from a theoretical point of view, no two people can apprehend God in the same way. This seems to be a logical deduction from the two simple propositions which follow :—

1. God is infinite and man is finite, therefore man can only apprehend a portion of the divine.

2. No two human minds are precisely the same; therefore, the fullest apprehension of God by two different people must differ, however little, although a more partial apprehension may coincide.

This failure to recognise the inherent differences of mental endowment depends on several factors.

1. The element of loyalty to parents and family which makes it easier to lose interest in religion than to seek a new form of its expression.

2. The reactionary belief of many clerics that their particular presentation of the Eternal is essentially more true than anyone else's, and therefore the best in an absolute degree.

3. The relatively small number of religious people who are dissatisfied by the limited criterion of spiritual life, which is presented by a church, serving primarily the ends of society, and aiming to ensure righteous conduct and little more.

Let us, for instance, take the artistic and logical types. It must be allowed that a service which emphasises the aesthetic sufficiently to be adequate for the artist, must sacrifice the rational factor to a point at which it becomes inadequate for the logical type. A service which is hearty, enthusiastic and spontaneously emotional will jar on one, while another will be inspired by it. When one recognises the various psychological types included among the children of even a single family, one is bound to regret the strength of family bonds in denominational matters. Their effect is likely to be that each of these children

will get out of Christianity not more, and possibly much less, than that particular denomination offers him.

Jung has developed type psychology further than any other writer. To him we owe the valuable classification of introvert and extravert—the first with his diffidence, failure of expression, detachment from his fellows, shrinking from publicity and responsibility—the second with the reverse of these qualities. More recently he has sub-divided each of these two classes according to the predominance of thinking, feeling, intuition, sensation.[1]

There are other obvious types whose characteristics have a bearing on their religion, as, for instance, the humourless man. Now the man who is devoid of the saving grace of humour is certain to take himself too seriously, and his religion will reflect this attitude.

This, being a congenital failing, is irremediable ; but the rest of us can always be on our guard to see that religion is not unnecessarily discredited by the pompous and pedantic rigidity apt to characterise the resultant religious manifestation.

[1] Jung's recent volume on *Psychological Types* (Kegan Paul 1923) is a work that should interest those preachers who are prepared to go deeply into this very important subject.

Let us then recognise that the only permanent reunion of Christianity is one which is characterised by a general and ungrudging appreciation of the individual's attempt to realise himself to the fullest in his religious orientation. The function of an ideal in life is to liberate and utilise our dynamic resources in conformity to our scale of values. These resources can only be fully liberated if the ideal makes a personal appeal, and if we have made an adequate transvaluation.

CHAPTER VIII

FELLOWSHIP AND SERVICE: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE HERD: PHANTASY AND REALITY

Synopsis

Jung's introvert and extravert types correspond to two aspects of religion: fellowship and service.

The function of the ideal is to liberate the dynamic resources of personality for service: but these resources are not the same in the two types, and cannot be radically transformed.

The criterion of the spiritual life.

Social and evolutionary demands in relation to the two aspects of religion.

Herd reactions in religion.

The dilemma of Christian organisations: rigidity for herd purposes: elasticity for individual purposes.

"The theistic phantasy" as an impulse to progress or regression.

Inspiratory phantasy in relation to facts and to values.

The analogy of ethical and aesthetic values.

The true vindication of Christian faith.

FELLOWSHIP AND SERVICE: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE HERD: PHANTASY AND REALITY

JUNG'S two types—introvert and extravert—to which reference was made in the previous chapter, correspond roughly to the two aspects of religion—fellowship and service. To the introvert, thrown in on himself, communion comes first and service second. To the extravert, in constant touch with his fellows, service must necessarily be the easier. But if the introvert or extravert tendency in the individual is likely to determine whether his religion be more contemplative or more practical, it is to be remembered that extraversion should be the discipline of the introvert, and introversion of the extravert. Long before Jung spoke it had been said that one of our first duties was "to encourage thought in the active and activity in the thoughtful." Similarly the objective should cultivate subjectivity and the subjective objectivity. On the other hand, it cannot be stated too em-

phatically that our dynamic resources being based on instinctive, and therefore physical, factors are only susceptible of transmutation within limits. The function of the ideal—let it be repeated—is to liberate dynamic resources in conformity to an accepted scale of values. Its function is not to inhibit nor even to transform the dynamic. Thus it is absurd to set before a profoundly philosophic mind the ideal of serving God as a Scoutmaster. It may be true that the philosopher's first duty to God, society and himself is to learn some rudiments of extraversion ; yet even so, this particular kind of service would demand a degree of self-expression non-existent in the philosopher's make-up. Again, if it be desired to present Christianity in the most suitable way to a successful auctioneer, it would not be wise to lead him to a Quaker meeting, but rather to a Salvation Army gathering. Obviously, the first would make an undue demand upon his contemplative resources.

Pratt[1] has expressed this contrast excellently in the following passage :—

" It is certainly of great importance that we should consider what we and our slum friends eat and what

[1] Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 479.

we shall drink and wherewithal we shall be clothed ; but there are one or two other things which it is well to seek, and perhaps ' the Kingdom of God ' is one of them. And while many will respond that the ' Kingdom of God ' consists just in the proper physical and social conditions, I cannot forget that one who spoke with some authority on this matter said, ' The Kingdom of God is within you. . . .' Even social justice and college settlements and industrial democracy and international amity are not enough to satisfy the full warm life of the soul."

Mazzini, on the other hand, warns us against contemplation in the following words :—

" We are here on earth not to contemplate, but to transform, created things ; to found, as far as in us lies, the image of ' The Kingdom of God ' *on earth*—not to admire earth's contrasts. Egotism nearly always lurks beneath contemplation. Our world is not a *spectacle*, it is a field of battle upon which all who in their hearts love justice, beauty and holiness, are bound—whether as leaders or soldiers, conquerors or martyrs—to play their part."

And Mrs. Browning has given us a well-known passage that is in the same vein :

> " A poor man served by thee shall make thee rich,
> A sick man helped by thee shall make thee strong,
> Thou shalt be served thyself by every sense
> Of service that thou renderest."

Jowett has said that " the worth of a religion to the world is the ethical dividend it

pays," and, tested by this standard, the religion of mystics and hermits might appear to be inadequate. While the mystic claimed that to him the presence of God was certified by his experience of exaltation, Jowett—and many with him—would have replied that his contemplation was an inadequate "ethical dividend" for the community. In point of fact, no assessment of worth is possible in the sphere of personal religion unless we take into consideration individual and temperamental factors. It is only when religious idealism liberates all the forces of a man's nature that it can be considered to have fulfilled its function. And as these resources are so widely divergent it follows that the results in "ethical dividend" will also vary. Professor Andrews[1] writes with truth: "It is useless to attempt to deny the fact that different forms of experience exist in different groups of Christians, and if we make universality the test, the results will be scanty and mean." The main necessity is that the man should know himself, and dedicate to the service of God and humanity his particular forces in the way in which they shall be most fruitful, without

[1] Chambers's Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, article 'Christianity.'

attempting to be, or to imitate, some one other than himself, nor, on the other hand, inhibiting his self-realisation by yielding unduly to his temperamental bias. Otherwise the contemplation of the introverted mystic will become essentially selfish, while the helpfulness of the self-confident extravert will degenerate into domination or patronage.

If these things be so, it follows that we must always expect great variations in the balance observable between the contemplative and the practical; that we must sometimes protest that an individual is yielding unduly to his temperamental strain; and that others must be discouraged from attempting to make adjustments along lines that are clearly unsuited to their temperamental make-up. And when all has been said it will ever remain true that the paramount criterion of a man's spiritual life will be the validity of his contact with the Eternal.

But there is another angle from which this subject of fellowship and service can be considered. Reference has been made in previous chapters to the social aspect of religion and to the evolutionary. Society wants service, and evolution demands vision. It is

true that in some measure the two are independent, but actually the primary interest of the herd is in objective results, produced either by fear—as in the Old Testament—or by altruism—as in the New Testament. Secondarily it is interested in the spiritual harmony of the individual as a factor contributing to the first object. The evolutionary conception, on the other hand, stresses the individual's subjective growth whereby he approximates the more to the divine ideal. Its secondary interest is in the wellbeing of the community as a favourable medium for individuation. W. Trotter has made us familiar with the mechanisms whereby the social group exercises such power over the human mind—" the specific sensitiveness of the individual mind of the gregarious animal to suggestions arising from the herd." We have already seen how the spirit of corporate dominion can control conduct, and the spirit of dogmatic opinion can paralyse thought in the suggestible man.

Revival meetings, to which reference has already been made, afford the best illustration of herd reactions and the psychology of the crowd. In order to understand their true

nature we must examine the essential characteristics of mob psychology. Normal social influences work from above downwards; in other words, new ideas emanate from the more highly developed members of the community and percolate downwards, thus enriching the social life. The process is one of addition; it makes for polyideism; it leaves room for individual discrimination in the acceptance of new ideas. Mob influences, however, operate in the reverse direction. They work from below upwards. An idea taken up by the crowd spreads with obsessing force and expels all ideas that antagonise it. It tends to emanate from the less developed members of the herd; it acts by subtraction; it makes for mono-ideism; it defeats individual discrimination because it has the irresistible force of the herd at the back of it. In short, when we are in intimate contact with a powerful social group, we become suggestible far beyond our normal degree of suggestibility, and tend to accept an idea on a wholly inadequate rational basis. Thus the religious experience of a revival meeting takes place when the individual is in an ultra-suggestible state, and for this reason is likely to be discounted when the

individual regains his normal attitude for discrimination.

It must not, however, be inferred from this that no good can come from revival meetings or mass conversions. There will always be certain suggestible types whose previous evil life was the product of their suggestibility, just as their subsequent righteousness is made possible by the same mechanism. What the psychologist may be permitted to deplore is the phenomenon of men attaining to a given religious orientation by a mechanism which, for many of them, is a second-rate one, and therefore unlikely to lead to progressive results.

Once we realise that social pressure is biological rather than spiritual in its origin, and objective rather than subjective in its demand, we shall grasp more clearly the central truth that the vindication of Christianity depends on profounder factors. Altruistic idealism can always be reduced to terms of ultimate self-seeking when we are dealing with herd demands. Instinct and reason prompt us to go the first mile; idealism, unsupported by reason, can alone dictate the second. The human herd offers many inducements to serve and to give, quite apart from the penalties,

implicit or explicit, with which it threatens the recalcitrant. And among these inducements the first is status, just as the chief penalty is ostracism. Man's sensitiveness to suggestions arising from the herd causes him to value very highly his social standing. Caste will always make a strong appeal to the human mind. To feel that he belongs to a group which is recognised as superior, and to be aware of the intimate support of that group, is an inducement to service which is wellnigh irresistible to the average man. The Mahommedan convert from Hindooism feels that he has become associated with a herd, sufficiently organised and coherent to inspire him with a sense of security, which was absent from the humble caste in which he was born. Such considerations can determine service and sacrifice of no mean order, without involving any true idealism or implying any real communion with the Eternal. R. L. Stevenson wrote with truth : " To do anything because others do it, and not because the thing is good, or kind, or honest in its own right, is to resign all moral control and captaincy upon yourself and go post-haste to the devil with the greater number." In this connection the following dream

is of interest. The dreamer was a young woman of twenty-five, engaged in religious work, but profoundly perplexed by certain spiritual and denominational problems. The interpretation, as here reproduced, was completed by the dreamer without reference to an analyst. The dream represents the play of conventional forces upon the soul thrown in upon itself, and seeking something more than conventional religion offers :

" Staying in lodgings by myself in a strange town. On Sunday evening went out, intending to go to a church which I had been told was very fine, though rather difficult to find. Wandered for some time asking and looking for it—rather annoyed by two Canadian soldiers who seemed to be following me. Thought of giving up the search : probably when I got there I shouldn't much like it, but reflected that I should have the whole evening to myself, and also that I didn't want to give up, having set out to find it. Shortly after found a doorway that seemed to lead to it, and went in, and up a flight of stairs. Found myself in a gallery reserved for school children. Came down and tried another door—found this part of the church—the centre—reserved for other people. Turned rather irritably to a woman at the door and asked if there was *any* part of the church where ordinary people might sit ? She seemed rather surprised, and said, in a reassuring sort of way, that of course there was—anywhere up the left aisle of the door

at which we were standing. I went in, and my first impression was, 'They are quite right; it is a most beautiful church.' (It was a perfectly plain oblong building with no decoration except some panelling—very lofty and well proportioned.) The church was rather full, but I found a seat near the front, next to some wounded soldiers. Thought the atmosphere somehow not conducive to prayer. Waited to see what was going to happen. Mr. X, who was sitting at the end of the row of soldiers, stood up with a book in his hand, and began to preach. I had no impression of what he was saying, but noticed that at one point he hesitated, and seemed rather at a loss. I thought: 'Of course he said he was not quite sure of the way. I wonder if he will strike it again?' Noticed that he recovered himself, and apparently brought the sermon to a successful close. (This episode is not very vivid.)

"Found myself looking through the East wall of the church, through a long, narrow opening, at a view beyond. It was a distant view of the mouth of the Z river—the castle and the houses on the shore, and in the foreground a wide stretch of water—rain about, and very beautiful colouring. . . . The parson stepped out of his place and across to me. He said, 'Won't you go outside there? It's quite my favourite seat in the church, only I've got to be in here at the moment.' Was amused at the Irish remark that the best seat in the church was outside it. I said, 'I think I won't just now, as it is raining.' (Heavy shower had come on blotting out the view). The parson: 'Oh, I shouldn't bother about that; it's not much. Do go out.' (Stayed in.)"

The subject of the dream seems to be in a dilemma with regard to the Church—that of the person who can't altogether do with it, and can't altogether do without it. The dream is therefore full of cross-currents, thus :

1. "You don't want to go to church, but you take great pains to get there, the motive being partly desire to find (*a*) relief from feeling of loneliness and being adrift ; (*b*) personal safety.

2. Justly annoyed by the exclusiveness of it, "No place for me" ; unable, however, to indulge this feeling, as the justification for it is removed. There *is* a place, and a pretty obvious one, to which you are welcomed.

3. Attracted by the beauty of the church—repelled by its conventional atmosphere.

4. Sermon by Mr. X (symbolic of wisdom and instruction) but, as the dream is concerned with the unsatisfactoriness of church services, the sermon is left a blank, and the story of Mr. X taking a service is only used for the purpose of selecting the one thing in it, which will serve the purpose of the dream.

5. The view outside. Here the dilemma is at its best : (*a*) Contrast between the church and the fine open view outside ; but if you hadn't been in the church, which was rather high up, you might not have seen the view. (*b*) You would expect the Church (represented by the parson) to restrain you, and turn your attention away

from outside. Instead it is he who invites you to the freedom, not only of looking out, but of going out. (*c*) So the Church is, after all, more broad-minded than you imagined. And yet this confirms some of your worst suspicions about it, for it is the admission by the church that the thing it exists for can best be found outside. (*d*) And yet, after all, you can't go out because it is raining! So you stay in, for much the same reason that you came in, namely, a certain commonplace necessity for shelter."

In this dream the vision is best seen outside the Church. Many sincere Christians will protest at what to them may appear a gross disparagement of the inspiratory value of corporate Christian life. Two things may be said in reply :—

1. This dream—like every other dream—contains a truth strictly personal to the dreamer. Its applicability to the problems of other people is extrinsic and fortuitous.

2. The message of the unconscious, as revealed in dream analysis, differs from the gospel, as usually preached, in just this way, that it is based upon the urgent, personal and temperamental needs of the dreamer. It need not, therefore, surprise us to learn that other dreamers have had dreams appearing to convey the diametrically opposed truth—*e.g.*, "I had lost my way (at the Front in France) and could not find my compass.

At last I went into a crowded Y.M.C.A. hut where a service was going on, and saw my compass lying in a corner."

Now no institution can thrive, or even persist, without a certain degree of uniformity in conduct, and identity of conviction, among its constituent members. Hence all Christian organisations are inherently exposed to the same dilemma—rigidity for herd purposes, elasticity for individual purposes. In many departments of life, the community and the individual must of necessity agree to a compromise. No doubt Christianity has influenced the world largely through its social developments, and it may be equally true that many an individual Christian owes his entire vision of the Unseen to corporate sources. Nevertheless, the psychologist is justified in pointing out that religion can only serve its full evolutionary function when its proclaimed message encourages the highest degree of individuation which is compatible with the same aim in our neighbours. This seems to be the acid test. A thousand ingenious rationalisations have been devised to prove that there is something inherently righteous in renouncing individual vision in favour of

corporate opinion. The Church that accepts the implications of modern psychology will have to begin by admitting unreservedly that, for certain temperaments, some form of worship, some presentation of truth, other than its own, may be more desirable.

It was said a few pages back that the gospel of the second mile—that is, altruism not demanded by society—is based upon idealism unsupported by rational or egocentric considerations. Let us examine the reply of the sceptical psychologist. What he cannot explain away of the religious life on a basis of herd expediency he will assuredly ascribe to the phantasy life. He will tell us that religious experience involves no communion with an unseen power, but is the result of man's traffic with his own soul. He will say that auto-suggestion accounts for the results of prayer, and that inspiration is the product of unconscious cerebration. He will explain that under educative pressure man creates for himself a phantasy in which are mingled in varying proportions the idea of security, the craving for omnipotence and the sense of superiority. We have already seen that there is a good deal of justification for such criticism in much that

passes for Christianity even to-day. But let us get down to the heart of the subject. Let us ungrudgingly give to the sceptic all that we can find in Christian experience and conduct that is regressive—all the craving for authority, all the lurking fears of the unknown, all the subservience to social forces, all the glorified materialism that we have discussed in previous chapters. Let us grant for the sake of argument that man *has* created this theistic phantasy. What then? Is he, or is he not, prepared to say that it is essentially and universally regressive in its results? Will he venture to deny that a single human soul has reached a greater degree of self-realisation through the inspiration of this "phantasy"? Is he prepared to take up the position of the Russian revolutionaries and denounce Christianity as anti-social in its consequences? He may do so, and if he does so he joins issue, not only with history—not only with many eminent scientists, but also with every man and woman who has watched at close quarters a life that is genuinely dominated by this "phantasy."

We have already discussed the inspiratory phantasy; let us consider it now from the

point of view of its relation to truth. The sceptic is always ready to denounce a phantasy as having " no relation to reality." Because the Christian cannot objectively prove the existence of his God, the divine nature of his Redeemer or the supernatural source of his inspiration, this critic condemns the entire " phantasy " system as self-deception that has, and can have, no ultimate ethical worth.

A very homely example may serve to illustrate this problem :

A, B and C are three drunkards whose respective wives refuse to live with them any longer. They are transported by a philanthropic agency to a distant colony " to make a fresh start." In each case the wife has promised to go out and join her husband if he keeps straight for a year. A keeps his pledge. His wife joins him. They live harmoniously thereafter. The phantasy of conjugal reinstatement has acted as a powerful and progressive dynamic.

B also keeps straight, despite the fact that he has had no news from home since he left it. In point of fact, his wife died the week after

his departure. The phantasy has been as dynamic and as progressive as in the case of A.

C, in spite of constant lapses, continues to report himself as fulfilling his promise. At the end of the year his wife arrives only to be disillusioned. His phantasy had been inoperative and his conduct regressive.

In considering these three cases we note that A and C both entertained a phantasy which was strictly referable to reality. With one it was operative, with the other it was not.

B's phantasy was compatible with reality as far as he could be aware—it was incompatible with an unknown actuality. Nevertheless, it was dynamic and progressive. We may say that a phantasy is to be examined, not so much in the light of its relation to reality as in the light of its potency to create or recreate ethical values, and to inspire a progressive rather than regressive response. It is clearly unjustifiable to deceive with the object of creating or maintaining a phantasy which may have a progressive value. No one would justify, for instance, the action of a third party who, knowing of the death of B's wife, had assured

him she was well, for the sake of maintaining the progressive aspiration. And on the other hand, if A had never had a letter from home, it would have been grossly unjust to suggest to him that his wife had probably died, and that he might as well give up hope of meeting her again, and with it the hard struggle against temptation.

There is a certain analogy between the ethical and the aesthetic here. A photograph of a mountain peak is in a sense truer than the artist's painting. It is more consistent with topographical reality. But at the same time the pleasant image of that mountain, which has remained in my mind since I last gazed upon it, is more successfully revived by the painting than by the photograph. In other words, ethical and aesthetic values are not limited by objective reality. The painting of the mountain is more valid for me than is the photograph. B's phantasy of a reunion with his wife was more valid for him than was C's, though B's wife was dead and C's was alive.

In *Religious Perplexities* (p. 107), Dr. Jacks writes: "There is only one way in which the truth or falsity of any creed can be

demonstrated—that is, by trying whether we can live up to it and observing what happens."

And so we see that the problem of life is more than the adjustment of our passions and our desires to reality. It is rather the constant manifestation of a heroic response in a universe which, if it is real in the sense of being an ordered cosmos, is dominated by values that are ultimately spiritual.

Hence it follows that the true vindication of Christianity does not lie primarily in the objective validity of the Christian's "faith," but rather in the power of his spiritual "phantasy" to produce results. These results must be twofold—personal harmony and social worth. One who was qualified to speak referred to the irresistible character of this dynamic vision when He said: "Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world."

CHAPTER IX

PRAYER AND NATURAL LAW

Synopsis

The influence of prayer—

(*a*) *On the mental life of the individual.*

The phenomena of auto-suggestion: Supernatural mechanisms.

Subjective religious experience.

The creative function of prayer.

(*b*) *On the mental life of others.*

Science and telepathy.

The use and misuse of prayer-power.

Relation between Prayer and the Natural Order.

The trustworthiness of the universe its primary characteristic. Man's will and causality.

Divine intervention and the thesis of an omnipotent God.

Age of puberty and phantasies of omnipotence.

Psychological criteria for testing prayer experience.

PRAYER AND NATURAL LAW.

BEFORE approaching the main subject of this chapter—*i.e.*, the relation of prayer to the material world, it will be convenient to discuss very briefly the influence of prayer (*a*) on the mental life of the man who prays ; (*b*) on the mental life of others.

Enough has been said in previous chapters to make clear the somewhat obvious lines of sceptical criticism on this question. We have seen that subjective evidence has little value from a scientific point of view, and yet from the point of view of personal harmony and personal conviction it is of paramount importance. We have seen that the sceptical psychologist is prone to attribute all the alleged results of prayer to the Christian's religious phantasy, to his auto-suggestibility and to his unconscious bias towards observing successes rather than failures. The Christian apologist will do well to recognise freely to how great an

extent these second-rate factors present themselves. No one, who has studied carefully the phenomena of auto-suggestion, can find any difficulty in attributing to this mechanism much of the harmony and peace which some Christians claim to obtain from a divine source by prayer. If a man tells me that he has never had a twinge of rheumatism since wearing an anti-rheumatic ring, I believe him, but I also note that he is an auto-suggestionist. If the same man tells me that in circumstances of acute anxiety he has obtained a sense of perfect peace after an hour spent upon his knees, I again believe him. Nevertheless, my previous observation leaves me doubtful as to how far the results derived from prayer are due to his own auto-suggestion, and how far to communion with the Infinite. Similarly, it is a matter of common knowledge that certain Christians will make a decision, or initiate an action, with conviction and confidence attributed by themselves to guidance granted in prayer, and that these decisions and actions coincide with their own passions and desires more frequently than might be expected. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the unconscious operation of their own desire was

the actual source of the guidance in many cases.

But, as we have had occasion to point out before, the validity of a supernatural mechanism is not disproved by the mere fact of showing how it can be frustrated or falsified in certain cases. The individual Christian, after all, can be the only competent assessor of the value of his experience in this purely subjective department, and his competence in such assessment must necessarily be conditioned by the extent of his self-knowledge. Furthermore, his own experience can be confirmed by his indirect observation of others. Those who claim to receive inspiration through prayer may be those who, in his view, show the most consistently progressive conduct—they may be those, in fact, whom he recognises as the most valuable members of the community. It is in this most vital aspect of the religious question that criticism is most easy, and that defence is most difficult.

Prayer rightly considered should have a creative function. All contemplation in the light of an unattained ideal, has for its object the creation of new ethical values. This function of prayer must elude the psychologist

as certainly as does the creation of new aesthetic values in the realm of art. Yet it is this function which, above all others, testifies, to the man who has experienced it, the validity of his conviction.

When we turn to the second point, namely, the influence of prayer on the minds of others, we find a ready analogy in " psychic research." The problem of telepathy seems to be still an open one. Scientists of considerable repute have accepted the thesis that one human mind can, under certain conditions, influence another at a distance. Other scientists have rejected what would appear to be favourable evidence on a considerable scale. Let us say then that science has been unable finally to disprove telepathy. It is surely reasonable to suppose that, if a God exists at all, He can influence men's minds at least as powerfully as, and much more easily than, they can be influenced by another human mind. But the point that the psychologist may well concentrate upon is the use which the Christian may make of this presumed ability to influence the minds of others through prayer.

A small boy of nine was saying his prayers one evening to his mother. A fervent petition

appeared for the first time to the effect that Johnnie Brown might become a good boy and stop swearing and cribbing. The mother reported this to the father, and together they rejoiced over the new signs of a truly missionary spirit in their young hopeful. The facts were, however, as follows :—Our Tommy had that morning endured a grievous and unprovoked assault at the hands of Johnnie Brown. As Johnnie was two years older, and about two stone heavier, than Tommy, there was no possibility of revenge on the physical plane. Then Tommy had bethought himself of a powerful Ally, who was alleged to refuse no believer's petition. Through Him, assuredly, he could exert power and interfere in the bully's life—for what would Johnnie dislike more than to be bereft by an unseen hand of his special sins of self-indulgence ? Nor could there be any possible means whereby the aggressor could refer the unwelcome punishment to the untamed spirit of his victim.

The power urge, the propagandist spirit, and the motive of patronage have already been discussed at length. It is obvious that prayer-power, in influencing the minds of others, may be turned to all kinds of unworthy ends. It is

also obvious that these ends will be repressed, and that the individual will substitute for them in consciousness much more ethical motives. But once again we have to insist that the sceptical psychologist cannot disprove the value of prayer in influencing the minds of others, nor its right use, by merely pointing out that there are deep-rooted human impulses of a regressive order, which can be, and perhaps often are, served by a misuse of prayer.

There is one point at which prayer introduces a broad philosophic issue of great importance. It is the issue between identification and detachment. Christianity, more than any religion or philosophy, has inculcated the duty of identification—sympathy, sharing the emotional experience of others. Psychology in general has supported the advocate of detachment. The analytical psychologist has some grounds for condemning the attitude of identification as he tends to observe morbid manifestations of it very frequently, and not only in neurotic subjects.

A well-known authoress suffered from asthma. A physician who specialised in this disease begged to be allowed to treat her.

She refused on the grounds that no improvement could be hoped for, as she had "inherited it from her mother." In point of fact, the mother had been a victim of asthma; the daughter had nursed her until her death, and *after her death* had developed the same trouble. The case was in no sense a hereditary one, but depended on a fixation of the daughter's emotions on her mother, which resulted in an identification of herself with her mother, and this manifested itself in the same functional symptoms. The classical example of identification is the production of the stigmata in his own person by St. Francis. It is clear, then, that there are dangers involved in identification from the psychological point of view. The hedonist also recognises the obvious threat to mental composure implied by identification, hence his advocacy of detachment. But if we take a broader view we are bound to admit that the essential Christian doctrine of sharing experience συμπὰσχειν can have the most valuable implications. It makes for the truest form of social solidarity; it may prompt the most fruitful forms of herd service; it may call for additional, but not necessarily profitless, heroism; and, above all,

the individual may come to rebirth more certainly and more speedily as a result of reinforcing his personal experience with that of others.

Turning now to the relation between prayer and the natural order, we find ourselves once more on ground that has seen many a battle before the forces of modern psychology were in the field. Without attempting to review these conflicts, we may accept one broad principle. If we are to interpret our universe as an ordered cosmos, and not as a meaningless chaos, we must attribute to it a primary characteristic of trustworthiness. What is science but a progressive revelation of the trustworthiness of the universe? The laws of cause and effect become increasingly known to man, and he recognises that natural phenomena are determined by factors which he is steadily learning to detect. It is only man's will, as we saw in Chapter II, that remains free, and even that to a much lesser extent than he is wont to imagine.

Now when the Christian prays for some divine intervention in the natural order, he is wont to defend himself on the thesis that, if there be a God at all, He must be an omni-

potent God. This is clearly superficial. No one consistently acts upon this argument. We all accept God's limitations. The most simple-minded exponent of effective prayer would not pray as the train steamed into the station, that the friend whom he hoped to meet might be in the train. He would know that he had either missed it or caught it. He would not venture to petition for an interference with natural law so ridiculous and so suggestive of the *Arabian Nights*. Yet, in refraining from such an absurd prayer, he is admitting the limitations of God—not necessarily the limitations of God's power, but of His readiness to interfere in the natural order. If, then, no one bases his philosophy of prayer on the assumption of God's unlimited readiness to interfere in the material world, it is merely a question of degree, and not of principle, where we draw the line between God's readiness and unreadiness to exercise such intervention, and it is not a question of His omnipotence.

An important express was about to leave a London terminus. An agitated lady assailed the stationmaster and begged him to postpone the departure of the train. He told her he

had no power to do so, and that the only man who could was the General Manager. She rushed to his office and repeated her request. "We have just heard," she said, "that our boy has met with a serious accident and is not expected to live. My husband is on his way, but he cannot possibly arrive until fifteen minutes after the hour of departure. If you keep the train waiting you will be giving him the only chance of seeing the boy alive. Surely, if you have any spark of human sympathy, you will not refuse!" The General Manager said: "Madam, I am very sorry for you and for your husband, but I cannot do it." "You mean you won't do it—you made the time-table of this railway so of course you could hold the train up if you wished to." "Madam, the train makes more than one important connection which would be lost if I delayed it. There may be others in the train to whom the catching of one of these connections may mean just as much as to your husband. My business is to serve the community by maintaining the most trustworthy railway service that is possible."

And, in this passionate attempt of many to associate themselves with divine omnipotence,

we see at work more than one familiar motive of the unconscious order. The age of puberty is specially susceptible to phantasies of omnipotence. The adolescent conflict with power is then at its height. Magical power is craved because real power is felt to be inadequate. This is the period when, more than at any other time, the dreams are crowded with symbols of the effortless solution—the flying machine, the electric switch, the lift, the moving stairway—and this is notably the period when the arduous challenge of life to heroic response demands some limitation by the phantasy solution of an alliance with omnipotence. It is to be admitted that the Christianity of many adults is alloyed by such puberty phantasies. And where these unconscious motives are operative, we may confidently expect, as one consequence, the frequent falsification of prayer results. The phantasy of omnipotent thought demands the rapid repression of all evidence of failure, and the over-determined proclaiming of all alleged triumphs. In such people we see, instead of the Christian equanimity in the face of death, a mendacious assurance based upon the superstition of " a charmed life."

In a most admirable leaflet on prayer which has fallen into the writer's hands, the following passage occurs: "It is the general background of our mental life which needs ordering, far more than our specific acts of prayer. We are constantly losing our poise, and forgetting the things which we most desperately need to keep before us if we are to attain to them, and to make them a reliable part of our subconscious machinery. Rules of prayer are really only methods of reinstating ourselves in mental attitudes to which we are deliberately committed, but from which life's disturbing influences tend to sweep us away. If these ends are clearly envisaged they can probably be secured more simply and directly than is usually supposed."

Finally, the psychologist may be allowed to offer to the Christian certain criteria for testing his own prayer experience:—

1. How far is the resultant equanimity due to communion with the Eternal, and how far to an auto-suggested pose?

2. Does it lead to Calvary, or to a pinnacle of gratified egoism?

3. Does it introduce yet more unescapable demands, or solely effortless solutions ?

4. Does it merely serve to harmonise conflicting instincts and ideals into a semblance of serenity, or does it release personal powers for active service ?

CHAPTER X

THE SEX MOTIVE AND THE SEX ANALOGY: THE "PARSIFAL" MOTIF

Synopsis

Fallacy of generalisation in anthropological and erogenetic theories.
Influence of instinct on religion.
The creative factor. Power and surrender.
The concern for posterity.
Biological goal of parenthood.
Spiritual goal of orientation to the future.
Parsifal.

The Grail and the Spear.
The development of the redeemer.
The essential function of the woman.
Redemptive inadequacy of the immature.

THE SEX MOTIVE AND THE SEX ANALOGY: THE "PARSIFAL" MOTIF

WE have already seen how some sociologists attempt to reduce all religious phenomena to terms of herd reactions; we have seen the validity of their theory in a partial application, and the fallacy of generalising therefrom. Similarly, there are schools of psychological thought that would refer all manifestations of religion to a sex source. We shall see that, as with the sociologists, there is a certain amount of justification for some of their theories, and that, when used as general explanations of religious phenomena, these theories are entirely fallacious. Indeed, the Christian apologist might be content to leave anthropologists and erotogenesists to confound each others' theories, without troubling to defend his own position directly.

Now, if we consider once more the primary impulses of our nature, we shall be able to

recognise, as we should expect, analogous aspects of religious conduct and experience.

The impulses, generally referred to as instincts, of self-preservation, the herd, and procreation, all make their several demands on, as well as their contribution to, the religious outlook of the individual. In so far as he can fashion his idealism to conform to their demands, he is peaceful and static. In so far as he recognises conflict as inevitable between instincts and ideals he must meet that conflict by moving ; and he can only move backwards or forwards—he must regress to the childish orientation, to the past and the instinctive, or he must progress to the adult orientation towards the future and the ideal. In the life of the individual the instinct of self-preservation is the first to assert itself. Then the problem of herd-adjustment presents itself, reaching its climax in late adolescence. Finally, the impulse to procreation asserts itself. We may say that these impulses are respectively associated with nutrition, initiation, and creation. All purification rites are of universal application, as representing conflict, failure, and reinstatement.

The Sacrament or Eucharist of Christianity

is therefore to be related to nutrition. It is a symbolic use of the primary lesson of human experience that, without nourishment, life must cease. The initiation rites of many Christian churches centre on the first Communion. The importance attached to these initiation rites is generally a reliable indication of the degree of social cohesion and discipline existent in the church in question. On the other hand, the symbols dealing with creation do not lend themselves to social uses. It is true that, in certain sisterhoods, novices are cloistered with a ceremonial marriage, and there are other rites of this class. But in general the creation and marriage symbols belong to personal and subjective, rather than to corporate and objective religion. This is comprehensible in the light of what has been said in Chapter VIII. on the conflicting claims of the herd and evolution. Procreation is essentially a personal affair, as is all creation. The human herd is less interested in the creation of new values than in the maintenance of old values. Social conformity has oft-times been sacrificed to creative individuation. Now in this we have the very kernel of human progress. In all lower species the security of the next generation

rested — apart from environmental factors —upon instinctive motives To-day among civilised peoples propagation is being rapidly divorced from instinctive and hedonic considerations. The widespread knowledge and adoption of birth-control methods are separating the hedonic and procreative sides of the sex function. Hence the actual numerical welfare of the next generation is becoming a question of idealism instead of the purely instinctive question that it was with the lower animals, and continues to be with primitive people. This is merely a supreme example of the way in which man is challenged to sacrifice himself, in order to adopt an orientation towards the future. In this connection Jung says :[1] " This . . . is a function that is exceedingly valuable from a biological point of view, for it gives rise to the incentives that force human beings to do creative work for the benefit of a future age, and, if necessary, to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the species.

" Thus the human being attains the same sense of unity and totality, the same confidence, the same capacity for sacrificing himself

[1] *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, p. 224.

in his conscious existence that belongs unconsciously and instinctively to wild animals. Every reduction, every digression from the course that has been laid down for the development of civilisation, does nothing more than turn the human being into a crippled animal, it never makes a so-called natural man of him . . . we do not help the ' neurotic ' patient by freeing him from the demand made by civilisation; we can only help him by inducing him to take an active part in the strenuous task of carrying on the development of civilisation."

It is obvious, then, that man—the " imperfectly de-natured animal "—has a special freedom in this matter of caring for posterity. The process of denaturation has relieved him of part of his instinctive concern for the future, and the challenge of progressive idealism demands that he shall voluntarily take up the burden to the utmost extent of his ability. If, then, man is confronted with this creative concern for the unborn generation, it is desirable that he should envisage clearly the broad fact that all creation involves a factor of surrender. Physical procreation in bisexual species is made possible

only by the surrender of the female. All aesthetic creation depends on the renunciation of conscious control, and the surrender of the mind to the emergence of new forms from the unconscious. All spiritual creation —the vision of the mystic, and the message of the prophet—depends on this same principle: surrender to a factor outside consciousness and uncontrolled by will. From this it follows, as has previously been noted, that the centre of gravity of the evolutionary mechanism is no longer power, but renunciation. Nevertheless, whereas, even among animals, the surrender factor cannot be dispensed with, so in the progress of civilisation the power factor is still indispensable. Man, with his physical and psychological endowment of power, remains a necessary complement to woman with her capacity for surrender, temperamental and inherent. And a further implication is that the religious problem of each is of a different order. Just as the evolutionary goal of every individual is, from a biological point of view, parenthood, so the adjustment to the infinite, and the orientation to the future, are the universal spiritual objectives. And, just as the attainment of the biological goal must

be by a different path for the man and the woman, so they have to travel by different roads to the spiritual objective. Man, with his objectivity and his power urge, must save society in concrete ways and be responsible for physical needs, and his reason and will must be trained to yield to the unseen. Woman, with her greater subjectivity, and her capacity for surrender, must learn to maintain her own rational independence, to discriminate in her acceptance of ideas and motives, if her adjustment is to be a personal and not a purely imitative one. But, for both man and woman, the great truth stands that the creative demands of the future are primarily served by intimate communion. In so far as the physical part of mating represents the most intense degree of human fellowship, it stands to reason that this experience is the normal pattern on which the individual may build up his experience of spiritual communion. But it also follows that the absence or failure of mating experience is likely to leave a biological desire unsatisfied which may, and often does, seek gratification in spiritual experience. We need only say on this point that the general thesis of this volume is applicable—namely, that

where there is an unconscious motive, the mechanism is to be deplored, however admirable the results may appear to be.

But the phenomena occurring in this way have been used by a certain school of critics as a basis for a generalisation. This has been very ably dealt with by Thouless,[1] and some passages may be quoted advantageously. Referring to Mr. Theodore Schroeder's presentation of the theory of erotogenesis, Thouless says: "His theory can be summed up in two statements. First, that all religion is a misinterpretation of sex feeling. Secondly, that religion is therefore completely discredited. . . . I do not deny (indeed I emphasise) the importance of the facts which Mr. Schroeder brings forward. I even suggest that they are so important that no theory of the psychology of religion deserves any consideration unless it take them into account. But the essential requirement of this theory is that it should be shown that religion contains nothing but elements of this kind, and this is exactly what Mr. Schroeder makes no attempt at all to prove."

Thouless closes the chapter with the follow-

[1] *Op. Cit.*, Chapter X.

ing admirable passage :—" It is possible that the Freudians, who insist that it [infantile sexuality] is a factor of such importance, are in the position of botanists who, having dug round the roots of an oak tree, have discovered the remains of the acorn from which it grew, and insist that in this, and this alone, lies all the significance of the oak ; and that the other scientists who spend their lives in the investigation of the structure of the tree itself, the artists who rejoice in its beauty, and the carpenters who use its wood, are all alike living in a fool's paradise, because they have not realised that the oak is a decayed acorn and nothing more."

There remain two aspects of this subject which demand consideration. The first is the influence of biological factors on an individual's religious orientation. Reference has previously been made to the ultimate physical basis of our dynamic resources, and the extent to which the nature of this basis conditions our available and total dynamism.

In connection with sex we meet outstanding examples of this correlation. There is a morbid condition occurring in man known to doctors as Fröhlich's Syndrome. It is

characterised by adiposity, arrested genital development and certain secondary sexual characteristics of femininity. It is due to a failure of the anterior pituitary gland. A typical example is that of a man known to the writer who has been married many years and—as might be expected—is childless. In all cases of either sex, where parenthood has been missed, not from lack of opportunity, but of capacity, middle life tends to be characterised by profound emotional changes. In the case under review the emotional change expressed itself in leaving a Protestant church and becoming a fervent adherent of an authoritarian body. It is impossible for the clinical psychologist to regard this as a coincidence. To him it seems incontrovertible that a regression to a religious orientation towards the mother—dogma and authority—was conditioned by that final evidence of his own virile inadequacy, which middle age brings to the childless man of this category. It is reasonable to suppose that his philosophy of life, at one time robust and reasoned, would have served him to the end of his life if the physical background had been normal. As things have turned out, he has shown himself at fifty more suggestible

than he was at thirty, which is surely evidence of regression that we may be permitted to deplore. This is but one of many results which emanate from biological sources, and their influence on our adjustment to life.

Let us now turn to the final subject for consideration in this chapter—the Parsifal motif. Wagner has given us a version of the Grail legend which is crowded with religious symbolism and spiritual teaching. For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the opera a brief synopsis is set forth :—

In the remote hills of Spain is situated the Castle of Montsalvat, the home of the Knights of the Grail. It was built by Titurel, the first king of the Order ; and it is here that the Knights guard the Grail, the cup with which Christ celebrated the Last Supper. The Grail had the miraculous power of giving new life and strength to all who gaze on it. The Holy Spear was also treasured here.

On the borders of the Grail territory stands the stronghold of Klingsor, a pagan knight who once aspired to join the order, but was rejected because his heart was not pure. When his efforts failed, his ambition turned to the bitterest revenge, and, in summoning the

black arts to his aid, he has set himself to do all in his power to injure and corrupt the sacred Brotherhood of the Grail. At his bidding there appears an enchanted garden where women of surpassing beauty lure young knights to dishonour and ruin. Once ensnared they become Klingsor's captives. Chief of these tools of his is Kundry, a woman doomed by her sins to wander the earth till she can find one to redeem her by his love. Kundry appears, now as the beautiful enchantress in bondage to Klingsor and working his purpose of destruction, now as a wild and piteous figure, wandering, and impelled by a passion for service, especially to the Brotherhood of the Grail, upon which she has brought so much evil.

When Titurel, the old king, resigned his power, passing into a state of trance, his son, Amfortas, determined that his first task must be to break the power of Klingsor, and remove for ever the peril that threatened his Knights. He set forth, confident of victory, for he was armed with the sacred spear itself. But his zeal was not proof against the beguilement of the garden, and it was Kundry who was his undoing. Overcome by her charm, he sank

down and dropped the sacred spear. At once it was seized by Klingsor, who struck the king with it and then disappeared. The king was rescued by his followers, but the spear was lost.

At the time when the action of the drama begins the cloud of this sorrow and sin hangs heavily over the Castle of the Grail. The king is being brought to bathe in the sacred waters of a lake near the Castle. Here he seeks relief from his wound which no salve can heal. The old knight Gurnemanz reflects :

> " Fools are we, for solace vainly looking
> When naught but healing helpeth ! . .
> There helps but One thing, One man."

The promise of rescue has been given to the king in a message of the Holy Grail :

> " Made wise through pity,
> The blameless fool—
> Wait for him."

But as yet there are no signs of his coming.

Then Kundry appears, bringing, in weary haste, the last hope for the king's healing, the balsam of Arabia which she has fetched for him. But this, too, fails, and the knights treat with suspicion the strange creature who, for all her works of devotion, disclaims thanks

and eyes them with hatred and distrust. If she has such power to help, they argue, why did she not give it at the fatal time when the spear was lost?

While they are speaking the sound of an arrow is heard, and a swan falls to the ground dying. Indignant at this profaning of the domain of the Grail, Gurnemanz seeks out the bowman and Parsifal is brought to him, innocently proud of what he has done. Gurnemanz explains to him his breach of faith with the wild creatures of the "holy woodland," and with a change of feeling, he turns away, breaking his bow. Then he is questioned, but he cannot tell who he is, save that his mother was one Herzeleide. Kundry adds more, that his father was killed in battle before his birth, and that his mother, to save him from a like fate, brought him up in the desert away from the wars and the learning of men. Parsifal tells how one day, attracted by the glitter of warrior's arms, he followed them, and lost his way and so became a wanderer, forced to defend himself as best he could. Kundry tells him of his mother's death, whereat he attacks her furiously, and then falls, half fainting. Kundry helps to revive him and

then begins to fall under the magic spell of Klingsor, which brings an irresistible drowsiness upon her ; she falls in a heavy trance.

The scene changes, and Parsifal is brought to the great Hall of the Grail. Gurnemanz has conceived the thought that he might possibly be the " blameless fool " awaited as the king's rescuer. He takes him, therefore, to be present at the celebration of the mystic rite of the Grail, among the company of the Knights. The king's agony is quickened to its utmost by the sight of the Grail. It brings to others miraculous life and strength, and to him the power of intenser suffering. He is only able to perform his part by being recalled to the promise of hope, the prophecy of the " blameless fool." Parsifal witnesses it all, takes no part, and can make no comment, but stands gazing with his hand on his heart. Gurnemanz, in angry disappointment at his unresponsiveness, bids him begone.

In the next act Klingsor's palace is revealed. He has recognised in Parsifal the destined redeemer, and is determined to employ his magic arts to the full to lure him from his mission. By his incantation he summons Kundry, binding her to his will. She is torn

between his power over her and her instinct of service and love. He tells her of the part she is to play in overcoming the foe he fears most, "one strong as fools are strong." She cries out with refusal, and the yearning for sleep and forgetting, but he is too strong for her, and reminds her that he alone can resist her power and that he is her master.

Parsifal has now been summoned to the Castle and has put to flight the knights in thrall who rush at him. Before him appears the enchanted garden, on all sides beautiful maidens assail him, clad in flowers; they vie with each other in their attentions to him. After his first innocent delight in their beauty and gaiety, he has a feeling of repulsion, and bids them go. As he turns to go he is stopped by a voice calling him by his name "Parsifal." "So named me once in her dream my mother." It is Kundry, appearing in supreme beauty, calling him from a couch of flowers. She speaks to him of his mother, of her love for him, she tells how he deserted her and how she died, till he cries out in an agony of remorse at his own blind and credulous folly and implores to be told what more he has made light of and forgotten. She suggests to him that only love

can heal the wound in his heart—such passion as his father felt for Herzeleide—such love as his mother is even now waiting to bless, and she draws him to her with a long kiss. It is then that the memory of Amfortas rushes over him with a sudden pain, and he springs up, with a violent recoil, crying out the king's name and pressing his hand to his side. He stares at Kundry, realising to the full the temptation to which the king fell :

> " So bent this neck above him,
> So boldly rose her head,
> So fluttered her locks as in laughter ! "

identifying himself with it and then casting it from him :

> " Destroyer vile. Get thee from me
> Ever, ever from me."

Kundry's response is to tell him with passion of her own soul's need ; of how, in a former existence she mocked at the Saviour, of how eagerly she seeks a redeemer. He offers her a way of love and redemption, that she should help him in his mission to the king and show him the way to Amfortas. In fury she calls down upon him the fate that overtook the king, and Klingsor appears brandishing the spear. He hurls it, and it remains suspended

over Parsifal's head. He grasps it and makes with it the sign of the Cross. The Castle falls, the garden withers to a desert strewn with faded flowers. Kundry drops to the ground with a cry. Parsifal hastens away, turning once to say to Kundry, " Thou knowest where thou may'st find me when thou wilt."

The last act of the drama opens with a scene of a bright spring landscape in the domain of the Grail. It is very early on the morning of Good Friday. Gurnemanz, now an old man, comes from a rude hut and stands listening to the sound of inarticulate groaning, which is coming from a thicket near by. Forcing the undergrowth apart, he discovers the form of Kundry in the rough garb of a penitent lying stiff and apparently lifeless. He carries her out and tries to restore her numbed body to life. At last he succeeds, and she rises and without a word betakes herself to service. Soon she points out to Gurnemanz a knight approaching. He is wearing black armour and appears with his visor down and his spear in his hand. Gurnemanz greets him and bids him lay down his weapons on this holy day. Parsifal thrusts the spear into the ground, raises his vizor and kneels in prayer. Gurne-

manz recognises him as the boy who killed the swan, the Fool he sent away in anger, and now the bearer of the Sacred Spear. Parsifal tells them of his wanderings and conflicts, and hears from Gurnemanz the sorrowful news of the Castle. Amfortas, longing for death, refuses now to celebrate the mysteries of the Grail, the Knights grow weak without its gift of life, and Titurel has died. Parsifal is stricken with grief and penitence and self-accusation and nearly falls to the ground. Together Gurnemanz and Kundry lead him to the spring, where Kundry washes his feet with humble devotion. He bids her also sprinkle his head, but while Gurnemanz does this, Kundry bends to anoint his feet, drying them with her hair. Then Parsifal learns that on this day, in honour of the dead Titurel, the Rite of the Grail is once more to be celebrated ; the last load of guilt is to be taken from Amfortas, and his office is to be performed by his deliverer. Gurnemanz thereupon anoints Parsifal as King and Priest of the Grail. Parsifal's first act is to baptise Kundry.

Once more the scene is the great Hall of the Grail. The bier of Titurel is brought in,

and the litter on which lies Amfortas, shrinking in an agony of terror from the task of celebrating the mystery of the Grail. In a sad chant the Knights rehearse the story of their grief. Amfortas springs up in despair, tearing the covering from his wound and imploring the Knights to strike him and grant him death instead of life. Then Parsifal advances and touches him with the spear :

> " Be whole absolved and atoned.
> Oh, blessed be thy sorrow,
> For pity's highest might
> And wisdom's purest power,
> It taught the tim'rous fool."

The Grail is once more lifted from its shrine, the chant of thanksgiving breaks forth, and Kundry falls dead as Parsifal, both Priest and King, blesses the kneeling company of knights.

The theme is the redemption of society and the making of the redeemer. The picture is one of an immature soul passing through the necessary experience to qualify for the great task of social redemption. We see the emotional development whereby the blameless fool adjusts his passions and desires to the call of redemptive service.

The two chief symbols in the legend are the spear and the Grail. From an analytical point of view they are primarily sexual symbols, and to the Freudian they mean nothing more. But interpreted in a broader sense—and we have ample justification for this in current dream interpretation—they represent the psychological qualities respectively of virility or power, and of femininity or renunciation. The sacred spear is in the first place used for the protection of the Grail. This corresponds to the statement on page 222, "Man, with his objectivity and his power urge must save society in concrete ways. . . . Woman, with her greater subjectivity and her capacity for surrender, must learn to maintain her own rational independence."

In the second place, the spear is laid aside and thereby lost: man loses his spiritual virility in yielding to instinctive impulse. The power thereby passes into the hands of the forces of regression (Klingsor) and a wound is inflicted on Amfortas that calls for redemption. All material means are tried in vain. The ultimate healing is by the touch of the same spear followed by the substitution of Amfortas by the Redeemer. We see, there-

fore, that the original failure and the final triumph are both attributable to the use of power. The legend occupies itself with the making of the man who can apply to the healing process the very thing that has caused the original wound.

It is from the Grail, on the other hand, that there comes the message of hope to Amfortas and the reviving of the Knights' strength.

Amfortas himself, as the king, symbolises the social principle, and therefore society itself. When we see him, prostrated by his incurable wound, he presents a perfect picture of society under self-inflicted and unconsecrated discipline, beyond its own power to terminate.

Parsifal is the guileless fool because he has never developed beyond the mother-phase. Note how completely this is brought out in the story. He was brought up by his mother Herzeleide alone. His father had died before he was born, so the second phase failed. The third phase is represented by an interesting touch. He saw a group of warriors galloping to a distant land: "Fain had I been like them," but he could not follow them. So the third phase failed too. Hence when Parsifal

appears on the stage he is a complete example of a mother-fixation, or emotional development arrested at the first phase. This is what constitutes him the blameless fool. He has clearly made none of the three great adjustments—he is unadjusted to society, for he has been brought up alone; he is unadjusted to the potential mate as is every youth with a mother-complex; he is unadjusted to the Infinite for reasons that we shall see presently.

Parsifal begins with three great lessons of compassion: the swan he shot; Kundry whom he assailed (when she told him of his mother's death); and the sufferings of Amfortas. The emotion of compassion is what has been referred to in Chapter VIII. as identification. No redemptive work can begin till the redeemer has identified himself with suffering humanity. Here is a very plain negative to the Hedonist's advocacy of detachment.

Next comes the Grail scene. Gurnemanz confidently believed that, if this were indeed the promised redeemer, the vision of his redemptive task would assuredly come to him in the Love-Feast. But the blameless fool has no vision: the most impressive service, the most solemn setting, the most urgent call

for redemption are alike wasted on the emotionally immature. Then follows the scene in Klingsor's garden in which three tests take place. The first is the encounter with the Knights of Klingsor, who are easily put to flight by Parsifal. The power of the blameless fool, as long as it is unconsecrated, has no redemptive value. The second test is the allurement of the flower-maidens—but direct sexual temptation is also wasted on the immature. Finally there is Kundry, who approaches him as the mother, claiming to transmit his mother's death-bed blessing and her last kiss. In a passage of intense dramatic power we see Kundry gradually changing the assumed maternal attitude into the really conjugal and erotic. Parsifal is wakened. He recoils in horrified realisation of Kundry's significant embraces. He feels the wound of Amfortas in his side. In other words, as soon as he has reached the fourth phase of emotional development, identification takes place. The redeemer awakes to his redemptive vocation. It is a phenomenon which must have been observed frequently by every analyst and, possibly, also by others. The failure of the two homo-sexual phases of development leaves

the youth inaccessible to mating appeals, except they begin as a mother-substitute relationship. The men who marry under these conditions are invariably dominated by a mother-complex.

Parsifal refuses to be seduced, and goes forth to the destiny which he now recognises, but not before he has miraculously regained the sacred spear which Klingsor hurls at him. In other words, when Amfortas was seduced by Kundry he was powerless to defend himself from Klingsor wielding the sacred spear. Where Parsifal had stood firm in temptation the same weapon in the same hand was of no avail. After this Parsifal wanders through the world for years seeking in vain the road to the Temple of the Grail. This is equivalent to the forty days in the wilderness of Jesus, or St. Paul's three years in the desert. It is the anticipatory period of subjective preparation for the redemptive task ; it is the precursor of the rebirth. At last Parsifal finds Gurnemanz. Kundry, purified and seeking an opportunity of service, anoints his feet, while Gurnemanz anoints his head. This antithesis is of profound symbolical significance. The feet symbolise the instinctive, as the head

symbolises the psychic and spiritual. While man can consecrate the will and the reason, only a woman can perform this function for the instinctive life of the man, and it is suitable that it should be Kundry. Then appears the procession bearing the dying Amfortas, who is instantly healed by the touch of consecrated virility in the redeemer's hand.

Now let us turn to Kundry and the function she fulfils in the redeemer's development. Throughout the story she is the world's Magdalene inspired by love and the desire to serve. Her love is at times passionate and sensual, and at others maternal and protective. At one time she is serving Klingsor and at another Parsifal. In her the spirit of compassion needs no awaking, for she it was who brought the balsam from Arabia to cure Amfortas, once the victim of her wiles. And when she had failed to seduce Parsifal, it was her special mission to purify and consecrate the passions she had aroused. Without her, Parsifal could never have qualified as the redeemer, and, had he fallen to her solicitations, his lot would have been merely a repetition of that of Amfortas Thus we see that the redemptive

triumph is dependent all through on the two elements— the man and the woman—Parsifal and Kundry, power and surrender, the spear and the Grail.

Finally, let us turn to Gurnemanz, who represents the father-factor. In the first act he assumes the paternal rôle towards Parsifal ; it is without avail. The pattern of benevolent and noble experience makes no appeal to the victim of the mother-complex. But in the last act it is different. Here the father authority and knowledge become essential to guide the steps and consecrate the thoughts of the awakened redeemer.

The legend of Parsifal has been dwelt upon at such length for two reasons. In the first place, it is a surprisingly modern presentation of the problem of redemption, consisting, not of a direct and immediate message from a delivering God, but of a process of deliverance within the human soul in response to divine awakening. There is no creed barrier here. The redeemer's qualifications turn upon his own reaction to emotional experience—his readiness to renounce instinctive gratification in the call to service, his own identification of himself with the suffering of others.

Secondly, the work of redemption is represented as a creative function. As such it is beyond the range of the immature, and, as such, it can only ensue upon the fusion of power and love and their subsequent consecration.

CHAPTER XI

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM: THE REBIRTH MOTIF

Synopsis

Religious Symbolism.

The preference for the objective and the aversion to the symbolic in life.

Value of recognising the symbolic in life.

New Psychology does not offer a simplifying formula for life.

Jung's theory of the function of symbolism.

The unconscious : its racial and personal developments :—Superstition.

The rebirth motif.

Essential position which the concept occupies in Christian thought.

The function of religion to create new ethical values —the factor of surrender.

Conception of rebirth in Christianity and analytical psychology.

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM: THE REBIRTH MOTIF

THE average human being has a profound aversion to the symbolic. To him the objective is invariably preferable. There is a type of Britisher who prides himself on "having no use for any nonsense," by which he generally denotes everything that does not pertain to sport or alimentation. And there are also the more thoughtful types who cling to the rational, and, because symbolism is outside the immediate zone of reason, they eschew it. Life can, of course, be dealt with on the objective plane. We can see in the story of Adam and Eve an ancient legend about man's disobedience, with a fairly obvious moral for insubordinate Sunday School children. We can see in the history of Jonah a legendary, and obviously inaccurate, account of God's power to save even His unfaithful servants from the most embarrassing predicaments. We can see in *Mary Rose* a clever and

amusing ghost story. We can see in our dreams a meaningless farago of nonsense. We can see in the bread and the wine of the Communion Service matter endowed with magical qualities. Life certainly can be treated on this objective plane. But is it not possible that this approach is unnecessarily sterile? May it not be the case that the deepest truths are, at least sometimes, expressed in a symbolic form, and if so, might it not be worth while to cultivate our appreciation of the symbolic? A good deal is heard in Christian churches about the "eye of faith" and "spiritual perception," but more often than not these faculties seem to be devoted to the appreciation of possible rewards in the realm of phantasy. It is certainly true that a recognition of the symbolic in life tends to introduce serious complications. Life becomes more challenging, and our own share in it less satisfying, than previously. If I dreamed last night that I saw Mr. X lying very ill and I had a peculiar feeling that he need not have been allowed to come so near to death, it is, of course, possible for me to recount the dream with jocular complacence next time I meet Mr. X and perceive him to

be in excellent preservation. On the other hand, if I stop to think, and ultimately recognise that Mr. X symbolises for me the spirit of tolerance, a complication has been added to my life. "Surely I am not getting intolerant? Surely that quality which I have always regarded as fairly well developed in me, is not in danger? Surely it is not *I* who am responsible for the parlous state of my own attitude of tolerance? It is certainly a very upsetting thought, so probably it is all nonsense. I always did think that dreams were rubbish."

There are other aspects of life in which, as in this one, we must face greater complexity if we are to attain to increased fruitfulness. To the man who is seeking a simplifying formula for life the new psychology has nothing to offer. It can only do so, and that partially, if it be used as by the Vienna School, to liberate instinctive dynamics without reference to idealistic aspiration.

The function of symbolism has been dealt with by Jung at great length. We owe to him a theory which is illuminating and appears to fit the facts. It cannot be hoped that any brief statement of his theory will be

convincing, even if it be comprehensible.[1] Therefore, the reader who is interested should pursue the subject further in Jung's own writings.

The unconscious, it will be recalled, contains both racial elements and personal elements derived from the repression of personal experience. Primitive man is out of touch with his unconscious, as is also the child. He therefore projects his unconscious on to inanimate things around him. They become endued with racial patterns of thought that are not recognised as belonging to the individual's own unconscious. Thus the impulse towards parenthood arising in adolescence is projected on to a tree, a spring, a river, and the object is endued with the faculty of determining fertility. The conflict between the individual and social tradition is similarly projected on to inanimate representations of ancestors, and these have to be appeased if the individual is to escape punishment for eventual breaches of the traditional code. Spells, charms and incantations are used to

[1] An admirable account of the Theory of Symbolism was contained in a series of lectures given by Dr. M. Nicoll at the Tavistock Clinic. An article based on these appeared in the Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology, May 1921.

deal with this projected element in the inanimate object.

When man began to detach this unconscious element from the objects on to which he had hitherto projected it, he became free to deal with the objects in question. It must be obvious that there is a difference in freedom between the man who can make an engagement on any day in the month and one who cannot do so on the thirteenth. The thirteenth is endowed by the superstitious with certain qualities which can only emanate from man's mind, and clearly not from his conscious mind. As a result of man's emancipation from the bondage of magic, the function of symbolism asserted itself. Myths, fables and legends were created as a form of expression of the collective unconscious, more true in that it was free from the objective. Mythology, therefore, consists of a symbolical expression of racial thought which has not been absorbed into the personal consciousness of the individual. It represents, therefore, the balance between the racial element available in the individual's unconscious and the portion of it which he has assimilated in consciousness.

As an example, let us take the question of heroism. The primitive, in anticipation of a challenging experience, seeks the magic stone or the idol which, in response to his incantations, gives him the necessary courage. In the age of mythology courage is maintained by the current myths of the hero seeking rebirth. Elijah retreats to the cave on the Mount of God ; the cave is the symbol of the maternal womb, and the story is a typical one, and appears in numberless forms in primitive mythology. His experience is a rebirth, and the story of it expresses in symbolical form the conditions of rebirth for the individual. Modern man, in seeking to make a heroic reaction to life's challenge, realises that it is he that has to undergo rebirth, and not the hero of the myth. He has to find the power within himself. This subject of rebirth will repay close study by those who are prepared to carry their reading further afield.

The preacher will admit the essential position which the concept occupies in Christian thought. It was not by accident that the problem was brought up at such an early phase of the ministry of Jesus, in the interview with Nicodemus. The subject of rebirth

linked up Christ's teaching with the mythological age, and His treatment of it is particularly significant. Rebirth was to be a personal matter from which no form of hero-worship, still less of object-worship, could acquit us. " Can a man enter again into his mother's womb ? " This was the characteristic attitude of the mythological age. Treated objectively, these myths of rebirth are miraculous and therefore not available to the ordinary human being. But treated subjectively, it is possible for every man to retreat into his own mind, to make contact with his own unconscious, and thereby to hear the " still small voice " of idealism, and emerge with new values and a new orientation. That is the conception of rebirth from which the coward within us shrinks, and through which the hero emerges. But it must not be imagined that mere retreat from the outside world is an adequate condition of rebirth. The individual's personal consciousness is not the " womb " into which the man withdraws. It is the subjective in the sense that there is contact with the unconscious—in the sense in which creative art is possible—in the sense in which progressive differentiation of hitherto

undifferentiated material, both racial and personal, is attained.

If this conception has any validity it becomes clear that the perception of the symbolic has great value in relation to the conditions of rebirth. One of the most important, if not the most important, functions of religion is the creation of new ethical values. No creative activity can occur, as we have seen, without the factor of surrender. When man accepts the intuitive or the symbolic, he is surrendering his rational discrimination to something within himself, and yet from without—something that belongs to him and yet that he has not hitherto made his own. This is the act of surrender already described in connection with art, composition and invention. When we say " within himself and yet from without," we conceive of the unconscious as that which has a hypothetical continuity with a—or the—universal spirit, and with which the individual himself can make contact. At a recent meeting of educationalists the subject of revelation was discussed. The Head Master of Christ's Hospital used words to this effect : " If you tell me that God rang up Isaiah on his telephone, I differ. If you

say that God broadcasted a message and that Isaiah alone had his receiver tuned to catch it, I agree with you." This is an analogy that permits a possible co-ordination with the views of the Zürich School.

But rebirth is something more than mere contact with the unconscious. The conception connotes a very complete surrender—the surrender of previous form, as when metal goes into the melting pot; the surrender of previous equipment, as when the teeth of childhood fall out to make room for the permanent set; the surrender of an outworn ideal, an outworn creed, an outworn adjustment, when such a surrender is the prerequisite of adequate change. In Christian teaching rebirth is often presented as an experience necessary to attain to a higher spiritual level, and one which occurs once only.

In analytical psychology the call to rebirth may be heard frequently in a lifetime. There is no finality about it as there is no finality in divine revelation. New circumstances bring a new challenge; progress is no longer possible on the old lines; the adjustment that was hitherto adequate must be discarded; out of the unconscious new values must be

created, for no rearrangement of the old values will meet the need.

Now this complete transvaluation is a process which must necessarily depend largely on the apprehension of the symbolic, partly as it occurs in biblical and other mythology—*i.e.*, on the racial side—and partly as it occurs in the individual's dream experience—*i.e.*, on the personal side. The psychologist who attempts to see any significance in myths recognises in many of them vital and challenging truths. The analyst who has dealt on any considerable scale with dream experience—both his own and others'—cannot fail to be impressed with the almost constant demand for minor readjustment, and the not infrequent call for a complete revaluation.

Two examples may be given here without, it is hoped, offending the sensibilities of the objectively-minded reader.

The first dreamer was a man of thirty-five who had written a book on the sacrificial system of the Old Testament ; he was an incorrigible propagandist, a fanatical protestant, a born fighter. " I was in some place where a lot of slaughtering was going on. (This recalled a scene he had witnessed in the Near East

when sheep and cattle were slaughtered by the waterside to victual a number of steamers.) I said to myself : ' It is a good thing I have got such sound overalls or I should get messed with blood.' The scene changed. I was in my present bedroom, dressing. I spat blood. Then my teeth came out, one after another, with much bleeding. I awoke in great distress." The first scene is the reductive picture. He had been exposed to the " blood of bulls and goats " and had been untouched by it. His adjustment was objective. He was spiritually impervious to any truth symbolised by the subject he had written about. The second scene, in dramatic contrast, is prospective. The challenge is to a complete transvaluation. The blood to be shed is his own. All his fighting equipment must be sacrificed. The change must be an internal one, personal and complete.

The second dreamer was a young girl of an aesthetic and romantic type. She was brought up in a nonconformist denomination, where colour, ritual and beauty were egregiously absent. She attended Communion services and experienced no real inspiration. Presently she began to attend another church

where a strongly sacramentarian form of Christianity was presented. We shall call the second church St. Jude's.

"I dreamed that I was attending the Eucharist at St. Jude's. It seemed to be an experimental service and I was one of the observers. Instead of the usual elements oranges were to be used. Many problems arose which we took quite seriously—for instance, who was to cut up the oranges? How were the portions to be handed to the communicants? And finally, what was to be done with the pips?"

It is unnecessary to offer any interpretation of this dream.

These are the circumstances which justify the conclusion that the man who ignores the symbolic in racial and personal experience may be compared to the owner of a wireless receiver that is so imperfectly tuned as to record only a fraction of the available calls.

The reader may ask, as many have asked, how he is to acquire this appreciation of the symbolic. He is referred to the bibliography at the end of this volume for his elementary education, and to his own dream experience for permanent continuation classes.

Certainly the symbolic factor introduces a complication that many of us would willingly exclude from our lives. But the religion of the Cross is vital and progressive, and to demand in it a stereotyped simplicity is to ask for stagnation. Difficulties abound in the arduous adventure of maintaining a dynamic idealism, and to reject new difficulties is to devaluate our own religion. Samuel Rutherford who, in his own way and with much ingenuous phantasy, had made no unworthy adjustment to his destiny, wrote: "It is not a smooth and easy way, neither will your weather be fair and pleasant, but whosoever hath seen the invisible God and the Fair City makes no reckoning of losses and crosses. In ye must be, cost you what it will."

And a modern prophet has written of rebirth: "It is to the heroic spirit, waiting in all of us for the divine summons which shall call it from death to life, that the figure of Christ, dominating the ages, makes its great appeal."

CHAPTER XII

FAITH-HEALING, HYPNOTISM AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Synopsis

The influence of the mind over the body.

Functional disabilities.

Faith-Healing.

A religious philosophy in regard to human suffering must be equally applicable to mental and bodily pain. The problem of mental healing is one in which doctors and psychologists are as much interested as clergymen, and not less competent to form an opinion.

1. *Suffering.*
   - Mental.
     - Avoidable.
       - Culpable
         - Due to sufferer.
         - „ another.
         - „ community
       - Ignorance
     - Inevitable,
   - Physical.

The heroic adjustment to the reality of the suffering.

Material and spiritual values.

Bodily health primarily a circumstance of environment.

A phantasy of recovery precludes an adjustment to reality.

Illness in the natural order.

The essential factor of pain in physical evolution.

Organic expediency and character values.

Significance of the Gospel of the Manger.

FAITH-HEALING, HYPNOTISM AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

THE influence of the mind over the body has been recognised in all ages. After the scientific renaissance of the mid-Victorian era a tendency asserted itself to belittle this influence. This was very comprehensible, seeing that the pendulum of thought was swinging far from obscurantism, and all metaphysical conceptions were rejected as unworthy of the new views of causality. But to-day the most materialistic physician or psychologist recognises the power of emotion over certain bodily processes. He can give a fairly clear account of the mechanism whereby such an emotion is translated into terms of physiological change. It is true that in practice a large proportion of the medical profession remains mildly sceptical as to the efficacy of mental methods in ensuring or re-instating physical health. Nevertheless, an increasing

number recognises that, in the disabilities which are described as "functional," the approach of psychotherapy is justified and often successful. In point of fact, there is a large amount of evidence to show the extent to which the thought-life influences bodily processes. The success of many fraudulent charlatans, the well-attested cures of shrines like Lourdes, the triumphs of an auto-suggestionist like Monsieur Coué—these and many other sources provide ample material for dispassionate study. But the materialistic bias of most doctors hinders such a study. They tend to assume that if an alleged physical disability has been removed, the disability must have been "functional" (and probably hysterical), and that therefore no physiological change has occurred. This is merely one more example of an unconscious resistance to unbiassed thought.

On the other hand, certain schools of clerical thought approximate to the strange metaphysical standpoint of the "Christian Scientists." They postulate that health is the birthright of each human being, and that suffering is invariably "contrary to God's will."

Let us begin, then, by surveying briefly the field of human suffering. The first point that calls for remark is the persistence with which a certain type of Christian teacher differentiates bodily suffering or disability from any other kind of suffering or disability. If it be bodily suffering, we are assured that it is contrary to the divine purpose. Sometimes we are told that "someone has blundered." When we reach the consistent Mrs. Eddy we are informed categorically that it is, not "someone," but the sufferer himself; and that it is not a case of blundering, but of failure to "let Infinite Love flow in." So much for bodily suffering, but what about emotional suffering? My only child disobeys orders, wanders from his nurse and falls over the cliff. He meets with an immediate and, presumably, painless death in consequence of his blundering. I am left to do the suffering. But when I go to the spiritual healer he assumes a perfectly different attitude: whereas before he postulated that it was God's will that I should not suffer, he now tells me that it is God's will that I should suffer, and proceeds to give me his ideas—often crude ones—on the

adjustment of one's spiritual life to painful circumstance.

Let it therefore be clearly understood that a religious philosophy in regard to suffering must be equally applicable to mental and bodily pain. In either field there may be both avoidable and inevitable experiences, as we shall presently see. Obviously, the attitude we adopt to avoidable suffering differs from that which we adopt to unavoidable suffering, but that has nothing to do with the division between mind and body. It has nothing to do with the influence of thought processes on bodily change, nor with the effect of physical processes on mental states. Both of these are universally accepted in principle, though in very varying degrees, by different schools of thought. The most materialistic psychologist admits that an emotion like fear can influence the circulation, and at the other end of the scale we have the " Christian Scientist," who believes that there is no limit to the physical effects of " infinite love " (which, however, he differentiates from any other class of thought). Similarly the most fervent upholder of spiritual healing will make allowance for some measure of depression after a serious accident,

while there are well-known and progressive alienists who seek to cure the insane exclusively on a physical basis. Let us then bear clearly in mind that religion is occupied with the individual's adjustment to suffering, mental or bodily, avoidable or unavoidable, as the case may be. On the other hand, let us recognise that psycho-physical interaction, of which mental healing is an aspect, is a problem in which doctors, psychologists and others are as much interested as clergymen, and perhaps not less competent to form an opinion.

We have seen that suffering may be avoidable or inevitable. The avoidable class can be split into two groups: (*a*) culpable, and (*b*) due to ignorance. The culpability in the first group may rest with (1) the sufferer; (2) another individual, or (3) the community.

The man who has been warned by his doctor that roast beef and port wine will inevitably bring on another attack of gout, has obviously no one to blame but himself when dietetic indiscretion results in further suffering. In so far as his gout impairs his social efficiency, he has acted as an unfaithful trustee. In so far as the trouble is painful but not disabling,

he has acted as a fool, in that he has not learned a simple lesson from experience. It is easy to recognise a failure of moral responsibility in this case, but very hard to see the bearing of spiritual healing.

A child suffers from a painful and disabling manifestation of inherited syphilis. One sees a clear call for the most thorough scientific treatment of the condition, and, at the same time, a demand for an adjustment to reality of a particularly difficult kind, in that it involves the hard task of forgiving the sin of a culpable parent. Here science and religion seem to have two very important, but totally different, functions to perform.

The suffering involved by, let us say, the Armenian massacres, was avoidable. The culpability rested with a section of the community. Mental healing seems as impotent as Christian heroism seems called for.

In the second group—suffering due to ignorance, we may again take examples illustrating the ignorance of (1) the sufferer; (2) another; (3) the community.

Twenty years ago a soldier who had recently landed in Egypt bathed in a certain canal. He developed a painful disease known as

Bilharziosis which (until 1916) was incurable. This canal was known to be infected, but no warning had reached him. He could not blame himself, and others could not cure him. Here one can see a plain demand for philosophic fortitude, which could only have been dulled by some suggestion of spiritual healing.

Thousands of children in India grow up with permanently impaired eyesight due to *opthalmia neonatorum*. The untrained midwife is ignorant of the simple methods whereby this condition can be obviated. Neither mental nor any other form of healing can restore the eyesight in later years, but there seems a very obvious place for the kind of faith that can overcome blindness without embitterment.

When the *Titanic* sank in 1912 a great deal of suffering resulted. It was generally accepted that no one was to blame. But to-day navigators have new means of obviating such a catastrophe. If " Spiritual healing " can cope with the aching hearts of the bereaved, it is a very integral part of practical religion.

Much of the world's suffering is inevitable,

and will continue to be so, as far as we can predict. Take a victim of the Yokahama earthquake ; it matters little whether he lost a leg, or a child, or a fortune. No one was to blame ; no ignorance of scientific law was involved ; the sufferers were all called upon to make the most heroic adjustment possible to the reality of their suffering.

The Chairman of the Guild of Health has been known to assert in public that " being ill never—or rarely—makes you feel nearer to God." The psychologist is entitled to reply that if Christianity has so signally failed men in a particular department of human experience, its organised representatives would do well to concentrate their efforts on a more vital presentation of the Gospel.

From the same source has emanated the pronouncement that " Christ was as concerned about the body as the soul." This dictum can only be regarded as an unresolved patch of paganism in an otherwise saintly mentality. Psychologists may not all be idealists, but they do, at any rate, realise that bodily health is primarily a circumstance of our environment, to the demands of which we have to make certain adjustments and reactions. The

Christian psychologist may see great possibilities of regression or progress in these reactions, and also certain opportunities of favourably affecting bodily health through thought processes. But, when he is told that this physical environment of ours was as important as the soul in the sight of Jesus Christ, he can only ask if there is any evidence to be obtained from Christianity that spiritual values transcend material values.

Surely we have a right to assume that the spiritual adjustment of the individual was Christ's paramount interest. If so, we have to ask ourselves whether we are to be more influenced by His ministry of healing, or by His example of the heroic reaction to suffering and death in His own person. It is clearly impossible for a man to make the highest response to a challenge if his first aim is to evade it. We may try to alleviate pain, but a point must come where the efforts we put forth to that end undermine our powers of adjustment. And bodily health is by no means the only sphere of human experience in which this problem presents itself. Take, for example, a business man in financial difficulties. No one would discourage him from doing all that he

could to avoid bankruptcy. Yet we can conceive of a point at which his efforts are based on a mere phantasy of miraculous escape—a phantasy which necessarily precludes his adjustment to reality. If, therefore, we start with the wide assumption : " It is God's will that you should be well and not ill," we risk establishing a phantasy of recovery which must necessarily preclude an adjustment to reality. And the psychologist may well ask at this point what warrant any Christian has for assuming bodily health to be God's will. We have already discussed the conception of a self-limited God and a trustworthy universe, and we have seen that it is logically possible to attribute infinite compassion and unlimited power to a God who yet refuses to interfere with the established order. Many, if not most, cases of illness come under this heading ; they are in the natural order. As such, it is for science to persevere in their treatment and investigation, while the sufferer falls back on his religious philosophy to make the most heroic adjustment possible.

And if we look at our problem once again from the evolutionary point of view, we see that, in the sphere of progressive physical

adaptation, pain, or the fear of pain, is an essential factor. It is a bold assumption to postulate that in the sphere of spiritual evolution suffering holds no essential place.

Much that has been said in previous chapters is applicable to this subject. The phantasy of omnipotence may be the unconscious motive that controls the spiritual healer who conducts world-wide campaigns of bodily cure. The phantasy of a miraculous escape from a hard challenge in reality may be the unconscious factor that influences the sufferer to accept the healer's ministrations.

When suggestibility makes possible the cure of a functional disability by the laying-on of hands, it is neither more nor less indicative of childish regression, than when it allows of cure by a medical hypnotist. Yet there is a frequent implication that the former type of cure betokens a spiritual triumph. In this connection it is noteworthy that the Committee which has recently concluded its investigation of spiritual healing [1] reported that there was no evidence to show that cures were obtained by spiritual methods which were not also obtained by psychotherapy.

[1] *The Ministry of Healing.* S.P.C.K., 1924.

There are many doctors who have learned to value for their patients the ministrations of a good clergyman. They realise that the patient tends to respond better to treatment when he is most poised. They recognise that this poise—this adjustment to debility, suffering, or the fear of death—can be communicated in a remarkable degree by certain people. These people are often clergymen, but not always, and by no means all clergymen fall into this category. Rather are they men and women who have on the one hand psychological insight—partly gained from experience but chiefly intuitive—and on the other a clear personal grasp of the meaning of the heroic adjustment and of the power of the Christian ideal. Doctors who have known and learned to value the co-operation of such men and women, will generally testify that they are not the type who practise the laying-on of hands. At the same time we have to recognise that this and other forms of spiritual healing are capable of achieving solid therapeutic successes. But therapeutic success, as we have seen in a previous chapter, is not a final proof of expediency. A case of insomnia may yield to bromide of potassium, to hypnotic sugges-

tion, to laying-on of hands or to a fundamental readjustment of the emotional life. The physician has to consider certain questions of organic expediency ; he should also take into account what we may call character values. He does not always do so. When he fails to do so it is more comprehensible, and less reprehensible, than when we meet a similar failure in the spiritual healing priest.

Above all things the physician, as opposed to the clergyman, has no *official* responsibility, for the presentation of religion in its highest form. We have seen how much degradation Christianity has suffered from the attempts to present it as "a paying proposition." The advocates of spiritual healing should remember that occasionally the doctor's resistance to their proffered services is due to his having a higher conception of the function of religion than they have themselves. In short, does our religion teach us that "pain is a deliverer," or does it merely offer us a possible deliverance from pain ?

Finally, the psychologist may be permitted to remind the preacher of the fundamental significance of the Gospel of the Manger. If the Cross signifies in one aspect the suffering

inflicted on the divine by human failure, the manger stands for the broad fact that the divine cannot be manifested in the human except through labour or pain—or both. However noble may be the task of alleviating suffering, there remains for all time a still higher task—that of furthering adjustment to suffering.

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